

of green
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1/8

c/f. 6.3

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR LIST S

On 11 April 1945 the Acting Director designated Major Edward Borst and Mrs. Jeanne Beeg, Assistant, as the official representatives of this agency in all matters relating to the Belgium Embassy. Major Borst and Mrs. Beeg had previously been designated as the official OSS liaison with the Dutch Embassy.

All OSS personnel who wish to contact officials in either of these embassies should advise Major Borst or Mrs. Beeg who will be glad to make the necessary arrangements.

16,671
Belgian Embassy
 x Liaison
 x Borst, Edward

11 April 1945

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am gratified with the continuation and increase in the conversations and exchange of information of mutual interest between your staff members and ourselves.

I would appreciate your noting that the following have been designated as the representatives of the Office of Strategic Services in our relations with your Embassy:

Major Edward Borst, USA
 Mrs. Jeanne Hogg, Assistant

When it becomes advisable for others in the Office of Strategic Services to meet with your representatives, requests for such meetings will be transmitted to you only through one of the above designated liaison officers.

I trust you will advise me whenever I can be of assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Dutton
 Acting Director

His Excellency
 Baron Robert Milverny
 Ambassador of Belgium

[Signature]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Col. G. Edward Buxton

DATE: 10 April 1945

FROM : William A. Kimbel

SUBJECT:

Attached herewith is draft of letter for your signature addressed to the Belgian Ambassador. This letter is identical with letter recently addressed to the Dutch Embassy and signed by General Donovan.

It becomes necessary because of the fact that the Belgian ambassador has questioned that he has never been advised as to whom he should recognize as representing us.

Major Borst and his alternate, Mrs. Bagg, have been carrying on this liaison for some time but have been handicapped by the lack of written confirmation of official designation.

W. A. K.

I would appreciate it if this letter could be returned to me when signed.

→ Alval:

Any notice
missing on this?
Please send letter
RT

330

APR 11 12 29 PM '45

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

Lt. (j.g.) Thru

M/Sgt. John T. Beaudouin

Personal qualifications for reports work

Bob Thru
He would in my
opinion be excellent
letter for you or for
new reports section.
Secretariat: DONT
lose him.
Woodsboro High School

1. EDUCATION

Subject graduated as valedictorian from Woodsboro High School, Woodsboro, New York, in 1937.

Graduated from Columbia College of Columbia University in 1941. Member of Phi Beta Kappa. Majored in English and creative writing.

2. EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES AND HONORS.

Served as reporter and editorial writer for four year on The Columbia Daily Spectator, becoming Editor in senior year. Also contributed regularly to Columbia literary, humor, and other publications.

Elected by student body to 9-man Board of Student Governors, which directed undergraduate affairs of Columbia College.

Elected to membership in the Columbia Naacoms Society, composed of the 15 men in each class adjudged the most outstanding with respect to undergraduate leadership.

3. OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE.

Following graduation subject was employed by The Reader's Digest, Pleasantville, N.Y. until August, 1942, when he was drafted into Army. As Associate Editor of the Digest, he conceived and developed ideas for original articles; read, selected, and recommended manuscripts for purchase. Became highly skilled

- 2 -

15,973

at converting masses of diffuse, inchoate, research material into a coherent, terse, and logical presentation which emphasized salient points and issues in priority order. On short notice he frequently condensed a 60,000-70,000 word piece of non-fiction to its essentials in 5000 words or less.

4. HISTORY IN MILITARY SERVICE.

After six months of basic infantry service, subject reported to the OSS Planning Staff where he has served for the past 22 months. In a recent memorandum his chief, Lt. Comdr. K. W. Hinks, stated: "W/Sgt. John T. Beaudouin has performed the duties of a Regional Planner with the Office of Strategic Services Planning Staff. His area has been the Mediterranean Theater. His work consists of the development of plans, programs, and implementation studies with all branches of OSS covering their activities in the Mediterranean Theater. As such, Sgt. Beaudouin has had responsibilities equal to those of majors and captains on our staff." Subject's planning duties have familiarized him with the plans, activities, and Washington personnel of all OSS branches and sections concerned with Mediterranean activities. In addition to planning, subject has also written basic OSS field manuals for X-G and Operational Groups. He is now engaged in preparing the history of the planning function in OSS.

In off-duty hours, subject has written and published four articles and one short story within the past year.

OISS FORM #001a

Date _____

To: _____

Re: _____

Can you look up a
 card for the funeral on
 the 10th. Perhaps you could
 get a card. Put it in
 the book to prepare a
 display for the meeting as
 necessary. *Am*

Office of the Secretary

10/1/50

Should be used for reference only.

Top ↑

OSS Form 4001
(Rev. 7/27/48)

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

DATE		
TO	NAME	INITIALS
	O. C. Doerflinger, Jr.	
	J. J. Monigan	<i>P</i>
	E. J. Putzell, Jr.	
	R. Thruw	
	D. C. Lee	
	J. W. Auchincloss	
	W. B. Kuntack	
	W. P. Milay	
	P. F. Pugliese	
	A. W. Salloway	
	J. B. Donovan	
	A. W. Asaath, Jr.	
	A. L. Dart	
	H. B. Hamilton	
	L. R. Houston	
	G. S. McClelland	
	J. L. McDonnell	
	J. R. Schaefer, Jr.	
	Secretariat Files	
	Director's Files	
	O. G. C. Files	

C
C
/

green
yes

Please prepare only

L

E (23695)

15.400
Belen, F.L.

Sept 24, 1944

"EVERMAY"
182 TWENTY-EIGHTH STREET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dear Genl. Donovan -

I hereby tender my resignation as Chairman of the Reporting Board, in the Si Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, to take effect preferably October 15th 1944, or November 1st at the latest.

Having devoted myself for over two and one half years to my duties in your organization, I feel that I have done my bit and that I should re-assume my activities which I abandoned in undertaking war-work.

Please accept my best wishes for the continued success of O.S.S. which

Even No. 10115

Exposure is 1/25 O.F. 6.3

15, 400
Belin, F. L.

5 October 1944

Mr. F. L. Belin
Office of Strategic Services
S. I.

Dear Lamot:

I am most sorry to have your letter of resignation. It always gave me a feeling of confidence to know that you were giving conscientious and thorough attention to a task that is so important for this organization.

I am sorry that you feel you have to go, but I know of the many demands you have to meet.

In your going I must tell you what real help you have been in the establishment and functioning of this organization, and how greatly I appreciate personally your support and assistance.

I hope before you leave that we will have the opportunity of talking together.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : The Secretariat
 Lt. Colonel Roberts, FFB

DATE: 26 September 44

SUBJECT: Comment on Pouch Letter from Lt. Brittenham to Mr. Shepard son on
 OSS Personnel for his Belgian Military Mission.

1. With reference to pouch letter from Brittenham to Shepardsen dated 2 August 1944, Assession number S-042 FOR "Should not men be selected in London that might be suitable?".

2. This office considers it advisable to secure men in the field for this mission if suitable personnel is available.

3. However, if through the efforts of our field men personnel with the proper background and qualifications are contacted, these persons can be considered in relation to the availability of such personnel in the field.

4. It is becoming more and more difficult to secure qualified personnel in the continental U.S. because of the many screenings by all government agencies.

pn
 P. H.

SECRET

SECRET15,325
Belgian Mil. Mission

28 September 44

General Donovan
The Secretariat
Lt. Colonel Roberts, PPS

Comment on Pouch Letter from Lt. Brittenham to Mr. Shepardson on
OSS Personnel for his Belgian Military Mission.

1. With reference to pouch letter from Brittenham to Shepardson dated 2 August 1944, Assessment number S-042-902 "Should not men be selected in London that might be suitable?".

2. This office considers it advisable to secure men in the field for this mission if suitable personnel is available.

3. However, if through the efforts of our field men personnel with the proper background and qualifications are contacted, these persons can be considered in relation to the availability of such personnel in the field.

4. It is becoming more and more difficult to secure qualified personnel in the continental U.S. because of the many screenings by all government agencies.

F. F.

SECRET

SECRET

22 September 1944

157325
 Belgian Military Mission
 X personnel matters
 X recruitment
 X Brittenham, Lt.

TO: General William J. Donovan
 THROUGH: The Secretariat
 FROM: European Theater Office
 SUBJECT: Comment on Pouch Letter from Lt. Brittenham to Mr. Shepardson on OSS Personnel for the Belgian Military Mission.

On 2 August, Lt. Brittenham of the SI Belgian Desk in London wrote to Mr. Shepardson (attention: Commander Strawbridge) concerning developments in the work of the SI Belgian Desk. Among other things, Lt. Brittenham stated: "Under the present organizational procedure in London, no direct request for personnel should be made to the Washington office. However, with your numerous contacts in Washington, if you should come across any men with the proper background qualifications, it would be very well to keep in touch with them and keep us informed."

Lt. Patsell has indicated you have inquired as to whether men should not be selected in London that might be suitable for the Belgian Mission.

We have been informed by cable #76331 that Colonel Bruce has allocated all of the vacancies in his allotment to SI, EAA, and X-2. SI has received 28 officer vacancies. Moreover, cable 76964 informs us recruiting against these vacancies will be conducted entirely in ETO except in those cases where men with unusual qualifications have been located in the U. S. No personnel will be finally transferred into OSS without clearance by the Branch with London.

We are not informed as to whether SI wishes to allocate certain of its vacancies for recruiting additional personnel for the Belgian Mission. Special Order #134 from ETO (2 September) indicates Lt. Brittenham of SI, 3 Belgian officers, 1 British officer, and 2 OSS EM, comprising the OSS/SI Belgian Detachment, are attached to SHANF for duty with G-2 Section. Presumably, Lt. Brittenham and the other members of the Detachment will accompany the SHANF Mission into Belgium.

At least one other officer who is a Belgian expert is now in ETO. At the present time he is assigned to the SI Staff with the 9th Army under Lt. Col. Sutherland. SI here believes this officer will later be transferred to the OSS Belgian Mission. No other recruiting is being undertaken for the OSS Belgian Mission.

John D. Wilson
 John D. Wilson

SECRET

European Theater Officer

15,325

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**


TO : Lt. Wilson ✓
Lt. Colonel Roberts
FROM : Executive Office
SUBJECT:

DATE: 19 September 1944

With reference to pouch letter from Brittenham to
Shepardson dated 2 August, Accession number S-042-802, the
Director has asked:

"Should not men be selected in London that might
be suitable?"

It would be appreciated if you would forward your
comments and suggestions on this matter to the Director at
your early convenience.


E. J. Putnam Jr.
Lieutenant (j.g.), USNR
Assistant Executive Officer

CC: SI

SECRET

FROM GUSTAV, CAIRO

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTING

DATE RECEIVED

IN: 18546

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR INFORMATION)

(FROM ACTION)

DISCUSSION

SECRETARIAT, SERVICES, SUPPLY, MEDTO

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **CONFIDENTIAL**

RECEIVED IN CODE

MEMO. Aldrich to Weston. In reference to your #40141, *attached*

General Sadler, Colonel Beller's commanding officer, ab-
solutely refuses to release Colonel Beller. He
very positive, and in his present job, is of great help to us.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SHOW

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OSS
Form 10 (Revised)*Bellem Cal 14, 969*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 24, 1944

REC'D 8/24/44 7:01 P.M.

TO

GUSTAV, CAIRO

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, SERVICES, SUPPLY, MEDTO

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#40141. From Cheaton for Aldrich.

CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel Bellem, General Giles, G-5, has given an indication that he would be pleased to work with OSS, according to word received from Colonel Olmstead, the head of International Aid for the War Department. Bellem has a background which would prove of value in our international aid work and has expressed a desire to do this. I feel that the best plan is for you to talk with him in an unofficial way to see if it would do any good to ask for his assignment at the present time. Our idea is not to have him attached to any OSS Services officer in any one theater, but to have him under the Director's office or under the Deputy Director Administrative Services.

100: 8/24/44 11:34 P.M.

OSC

CONFIDENTIAL**FILE COPY**

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Beltz, Cal 14 969

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

2 August 1944

TO: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan
FROM: Louis M. Ream

As you know, Col. Belm has been International Aid Officer in Cairo. We are now informed by Col. Olmstead *Balthana* that Col. Belm is also Executive Officer of AMHQ in Cairo. Col. Olmstead has received a letter from Col. Belm stating that he would like to transfer to OSS.

In view of your coming trip this information is given so that when you get in the theatre you may be able to exert the necessary influence to get Col. Belm transferred to OSS for work in connection with International Aid. He is highly qualified for this assignment and would be extremely valuable.

L. M. Ream
Louis M. Ream
Deputy Director
Administrative Services

*wired to WJD
9/5*

*call 54151 To
aug 16 44 7. Action book*

SECRET

Top ↑

OSS Form 4351

Date 5/31

To: Lt. Putzell

Captain Merlet telephoned to say Ensign Behn was recruited here in the US by Lt. Roberts, MU. Later, when Lt. Gilpatrick and Commander Guest drew up the specifications of persons needed in London, and Behn fitted those requirements, they sent him over.

Captain Merlet says there is no apparent reason why Ens. Behn was not needed as he was suitably qualified

Out

Car

the

PCH

52101

Call from London asking for priority
for Behn dated March 20, 1944
Behn requested for duty Jan. 26, 1944

Office of the Executive Officer

(30489)

Even No. rolls!

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

CONFIDENTIAL*Behn, V. C. 14,542*

JRM/ro

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

30 May 1944

From: Personnel Officer, MU
 To: Captain Carl Merlet
 253 South Building

Subject: V. C. Behn, Ensign, USNR

1. As requested, I am submitting herewith a short statement of the background of the subject.

Subject is 21 years of age, 6'1" and weighs 195 lbs. He graduated from Rutgers University in 1943 with a Bachelor of Science degree.

Upon graduation he enlisted in the Navy V-7 program and completed Naval Midshipman School; after which he was assigned to the Bomb Disposal School, Washington, D. C. His training in Midshipman School included seamanship, navigation and ordnance. His training with the Navy Bomb Disposal School included studies of bombs and fuses, demolitions, booby traps, A/P mines, anti-tank mines and projectiles.

Since his assignment with OSS he has attended A-4 and the Maritime Training School on the West Coast. At both of these Areas he was rated between "very satisfactory" and "excellent". I quote remarks of the chief instructor at A-4.

"Good leader of high intelligence. Has had experience in demolitions. Well-liked. Interested and cooperative. A field man; showed good effort. Very good in coding and highly recommended for advanced training."

Subject was assigned to the MU-ETO as an operational man and also to act as an instructor and technical adviser in the use of demolitions. He departed for the theater on 26 April 1944.

*enter from letter
48071*

John J. Moran
 John J. Moran
 Lieut., USNR

CONFIDENTIAL

Behn V. C. 14, 3 43

Form 19 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE
FROM

May 26, 1944

USTRAVIC, LONDON

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IN-10795

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR INFORMATION)

(FOR ACTION)

BUXTON

NO, NAVAL COMMAND, SECRETARIAT,
MAGRUDER, SCRIBNER, WFO, X-2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37588-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **CONFIDENTIAL**

#48071. From Armour and Bruce to Buxton, Naval Command and Roberts.

1. Ensign Vaughn C. Behn, USNR, has reported to Mari-time Branch. There is no position for him in any OSS branch this theater. He requests transfer to Far East. Is there position for him there? If so what is his destination?

2. Desire this information so that we may have orders prepared and arrange transportation if you so direct us.

TOR: 5/26/44 3:04 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

AIR POUCH*Bedford Henry*
1914
*L***NAVFORS HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-6 (Publicity and Psychological Warfare) Division**

28 March 1944

SUBJECT: Henry Bedford 109.**TO : General William Donovan**

Fred Cushman asked me to write you about this man as he may drop in to see you after your return to Washington. David Bruce, Sam Smith, and I think that he might be useful in French territory or elsewhere on the continent for high level liaison for OSS and PWB. David Bruce and I know Henry well and have a high opinion of him.

Henry is one of the Standard Oil of New Jersey Bedfords and has been in Europe for that company for over twenty years. For the last ten years he has been in London as a member of the small top group controlling European operations. For the ten years preceding, he was head of the company's business in France and a member of the committee controlling policy. He knows France and the French and is familiar with the rest of Europe. *European*

There is no need for his services at the moment but he might be a valuable man after we get well into France. Therefore we have initiated a security check with the idea of having him available for duty when needed. He is to be in the United States for a couple of months on business.

W. B. Thompson
W. B. THOMPSON

EX-103 21 ON 2 22

CM3

OSS FORM 4001a

Date 11 April 1944 *77 Su*

To: *CL*
Secy
Mr. Cheston
Colonel Gregory
Colonel Bigelow
Colonel Mann
Mr. Shephardson
Director's Office

Office of the Secretariat

(9138)

Top ↑

OSS Form 4191

Date 1 April '44To MAJOR LEE

Will you please see that
MO, Whitney Shepardon, Col. Gregory
and possibly one or two others know
about this and then return to the
General's files.

CCD

Office of the Executive Officer

(Stamp)

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

*Bedford Henry 14,174*AIR POUCH

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-6 (Publicity and Psychological Warfare) Division

28 March 1944

Subject: Henry Bedford 109.

To : General William Donovan

Fred Ochsner asked me to write you about this man as he may drop in to see you after your return to Washington. David Bruce, Rao Smith, and I think that he might be useful in French territory or elsewhere on the continent for high level liaison for OSS and PWB. David Bruce and I know Henry well and have a high opinion of him.

Henry is one of the Standard Oil of New Jersey Bedfords and has been in Europe for that company for over twenty years. For the last ten years he has been in London as a member of the small top group controlling European Operations. For the ten years preceding, he was head of the company's business in France and a member of the committee controlling European policy. He knows France and the French and is familiar with the rest of Europe.

There is no need for his services at the moment but he might be a valuable man after we get well into France. Therefore we have initiated a security check with the idea of having him available for duty when needed. He is to be in the United States for a couple of months on business.

Signed C. B. Compton

COPY

*Belden Jack 1944*OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.*File*

25 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN.

From: H. P. Allman *NOT*

Subject: Jack Belden

Not -
Mr. Allman
Thanks and will be
glad to see Belden
when I am for a time in Italy

Jack Belden recently passed through Washington and called me up and asked whether or not he could see you. I told him this would have to be arranged with you directly, but at that time you were out of Washington. I suggested that he endeavor to contact you directly some time, either here or in New York. Jack, as you probably will recall, wrote a book entitled "Retreat With Stillwell," and was subsequently a "Life" or "Time" correspondent. Following General Stillwell's retreat, he went to North Africa as a correspondent and was rather badly injured at Salerno. He is now in the United States recuperating.

Done
HP
4/27

Belden, just prior to the War, had been working on a manuscript concerning the Japanese Intelligence Service, and I have been following Belden around the world trying to get a copy of this manuscript. I found, however, that it had been seized by the Japanese in Shanghai, but Belden did give us a considerable amount of material concerning Japanese, and Puppet, opium, and kidnapping and assassination gangs in Shanghai. This material contains some useful information about a presently prominent and active Japanese Agent in China, as well as about several prominent, active Chinese Puppets.

(K)

- 2 -

I presume Jack will follow up his desire to see you and I thought you might be interested in the above details.

M. F. A.

Hon. Harold D. Smith
Director
Bureau of the Budget
Executive Offices of the President
Washington, D. C.

A claim against the United States has been presented to this agency by Miss Olive P. Beall, Beltsville, Maryland, for damage to privately-owned property in the amount of \$107.00, claimed to have been caused by an employee of the Government, attached to this agency, acting within the scope of his employment. I have considered the claim pursuant to the provisions of the Act of December 28, 1922 (42 Stat. 1465; 38 U. S. C. 215), and I hereby recommend that the claim be submitted to Congress for appropriation in the amount of \$107.00.

On December 12, 1964, Plaintiff parked and locked her automobile approximately 1:00 P.M. south from the corner of the Connecticut Avenue in the west side of 17th Street, N. W., in Washington, D. C. Plaintiff's car was thereafter struck by a government-owned Dodge truck controlled at the direction of Strategic Services and driven by Robert Lee Williams, a government employee. The driving of the government vehicle was at the time the accident occurred under favorable weather conditions. Plaintiff testified that she was driving down to adjust the handbrake, when the truck started to the right and to strike her. Plaintiff's car sustained damage to the left side of the car, and Plaintiff was not present at the time of the accident, and as her car appeared to have been lawfully parked, there is no indication that it was seen in any way by the government employee. The damage was promptly repaired by the government for necessary repairs. Repairs were estimated at a cost of \$107.95, the lowest estimate submitted, and a bill submitted to the agency for the same amount dated 12 January 1964 in that amount.

- 2 -

Upon a review of the pertinent facts, as disclosed by the file, I have concluded that the damage to claimant's health was caused by the negligence of an employee of the government acting within the scope of his employment. I have further concluded that the amount of the claim is just and reasonable, and that the claim should be allowed in its entirety pursuant to the provisions of the Act of December 18, 1945. The claim was filed within the statutory period.

I therefore recommend to you that the claim of Miss Mary P. Hall in the amount of \$107.85 be certified to you as a legal claim for payment.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Norton
Assistant Director

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

VEN No. 10/10

CONFIDENTIAL

Bans:rlc

De. H. K. H. H. H.
CONFIDENTIAL

*X Doetsch, Joseph
New Enemy Control*

9 February 1944.

Mr. Edward J. Ennis, Director,
Alien Enemy Control Unit,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ennis:

Thank you very much for having furnished
to us with your letter of 4 February 1944, photo-
graphs in triplicate of William Behnke and Joseph
Alois Doetsch. These photographs were requested
by Mr. Kasper's office in pursuance of his work
for us and we shall be able to make appropriate
disposition of them.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Burton,
Acting Director.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ennis

EDWARD J. ENNIS
DIRECTOR

Department of Justice

Alien Enemy Control Unit

Washington

February 4, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Re: BEHNKE, William
DOETSCH, Joseph Alois

Please find enclosed photographs in triplicate of the above-named alien enemies now interned at Seagoville, Texas.

These photographs were sent by the Camp Authorities to Mr. Robert Kempner, apparently at his request, in care of this Unit.

Since Mr. Kempner was admitted to the Seagoville Camp in company with Mr. H. L. Salsman in conformance with a request from your office to this Unit, I assume that these photographs were requested by Mr. Kempner in pursuance of his work for you, and, accordingly you will be able to make appropriate disposition of them.

Very truly yours,

Edward J. Ennis

Edward J. Ennis
Director

Enclosure:

2 Photographs
in triplicate.



CONFIDENTIAL

TMO/vgh

CONFIDENTIAL

February 4, 1944

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan
 Director
 Office of Strategic Services
 25th and E Streets, N. W.
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Re: HEDDER, William
 HEDDER, Joseph, Alaska

Please find enclosed photographs in triplicate of the above-named alien enemies now interned at Sengville, Tuma.

These photographs were sent by the Camp Authorities to Mr. Robert Neupner, apparently at his request, in care of this Unit.

Since Mr. Neupner was admitted to the Sengville Camp in company with Mr. E. L. Salomon in accordance with a request from your office to this Unit, I assume that these photographs were requested by Mr. Neupner in pursuance of his work for you, and, accordingly you will be able to make appropriate disposition of them.

Very truly yours,

Harold J. Davis
 Director

Enclosures:

2 Photographs
 in triplicate.

CONFIDENTIAL

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edges of

f.6.3

f green
edges of

f. 6.3

17282
CONFIDENTIAL

18 August 1944

SRI Bureau, Ralph A. (S)

Subject: Promotion

To : The Adjutant General

From : Officer's Branch, Promotion Section
Wartime Building
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Under the provisions of AR 600-10, as amended, it is recommended that the following named officer be promoted as indicated:

Identified Colonel Ralph A. Burns, 0917815, AUS

Date of last promotion: 8 November 1944

Grade recommended: Colonel

2. A position vacancy exists in accordance with approved table of organization for this organization, and the filling of such vacancy by the promotion of this officer together with all pertinent recommendations put noted upon, will not operate to cause the vacating of position vacante.

3. Identified Colonel Burns occupies the position of Chief, Personnel Branch, of the Office of Strategic Services and upon promotion will continue to occupy such position.

4. Identified Colonel Burns has already demonstrated his ability for the responsibilities and duties of the position and grade for which promotion is recommended in his recent and in his earlier assignments for an aggregate period in excess of three years. In this capacity he is responsible for:

- (a) Establishing policies and procedures for personnel management and administration both in the continental United States and overseas. These include the personnel management channels of military, naval and civilian personnel in response to requisitions from the several branches and offices of this organization and in accordance with job specifications.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

- (b) Maintaining liaison with the Civil Service Commission and the War Relocation Commission;
- (c) Acting for the Director on all agency matters of importance as the latter may direct;
- (d) Examining requests for allotments of personnel to various Corps and Civil Control persons, including the allotment of all good and ratings in the various branches of the military;
- (e) Insuring strict adherence to personnel procurement policies of the War Relocation Commission and the various agencies of the War Relocation Commission and other Government agencies;
- (f) Processing all overseas personnel;
- (g) Determining the type of information to be supplied by overseas installations and the type of assignment or reassignment of personnel;
- (h) Maintaining the classification of civilian personnel and maintaining necessary records in connection with personnel;
- (i) Supervising and coordinating the program specifically governing the welfare and morale of civilian personnel.

5. The duties and responsibilities of the Chief, Personnel Branch, as described above are commensurate with those of a Colonel in the grade of Colonel. The personnel policies and procedures for this organization are established by the War Relocation Commission with the approval of the Director. It is noted that the classification of personnel both in this country and overseas is of July 1944, the strength of the military personnel totaled 11,001 Army, Navy and civilian personnel. In view of the importance of the above described duties and responsibilities of the Chief, Personnel Branch, it is strongly recommended that the grade be raised to that of a Colonel as set forth in paragraph 4, as set forth in the text.

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6. No AGO Form 30-4 is required.

7. There is no surplus officer available in this command in the grade for which promotion is recommended who can be assigned to fill this position vacancy.

8. This officer is not under consideration for relief from active duty is not a member of a wait scheduled for promotion, and, if promoted, will continue to occupy the position for which recommended or a similar position commensurate with the higher grade.

9. The relative merit of this officer has been considered and to the best of my knowledge he is the best fitted officer available in this command for the grade and position for which promotion is recommended.

For and in the absence of the Director:

CHARLES E. CRISTON
Assistant Director

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1945

TO : Mr. O'Gara

FROM : Lt. Cmdr. Antell

SUBJECT: Men Suggested to General Donovan by Captain Crockett.

1. Lt. Thurn in a memorandum of 7 March 1945 stated that General Donovan wanted you to look into the potentialities of Langdon Warner and Gordon Boles. You passed this memorandum on to me.

2. We immediately wrote to Professor Warner submitting SA-14 forms to him. Professor Warner has just returned these completed forms stating that he prefers not to be considered for a position. Incidentally I find that he will be 64 years old in August.

3. As Gordon Boles is in the State Department we have referred his case to Miss Feldman who is investigating it. Obviously this case calls for careful handling.

B.W.A.

16.512
Boles, Gordon
x Warner, Langdon

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

17 April 1945

W. Thrum
UP
P. 18

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. John E. O'Gara

FROM: Lt. Comdr. B. W. Antell, USNR

SUBJECT: Men Suggested to General Donovan by
Captain Crockett

1. Lieut. Thrum, in a memorandum of 7 March 1945, stated that General Donovan wanted you to look into the potentialities of Langdon Warner and Gordon Boles. You passed this memorandum on to me.

2. In a memorandum to you of 14 March 1945, I reported that Professor Warner stated that he did not wish to be considered for a position.

3. I also reported that Miss Feldman was looking into the matter of Gordon Boles as he is in the State Department. Miss Feldman now reports that State Department will not make Gordon Boles available.

B. W. A.

(Circular stamp: *Hold for* *W. B.*)

CONFIDENTIAL

16,512

Belen, Gordon

14 March 1945

TO : Mr. O'Shea

FROM : Lt. Comdr. Antell

SUBJECT: Man Suggested to General Banova by Captain Crockett.

1. Lt. Thoma in a memorandum of 7 March 1945 stated that General Banova wanted you to look into the potentialities of Douglas Warner and Gordon Belen. You passed this memorandum on to me.

2. We immediately wrote to Professor Warner submitting his name to him. Professor Warner has just returned from England stating that he prefers not to be considered for a position. Incidentally I knew that he will be 64 years old in August.

3. As Gordon Belen is in the State Department we have referred his case to Miss Feltman who is investigating it obviously this case calls for careful handling.

B.N.A.

OSS Form 1084b

DATE _____

TO: _____

*To be attached
to "Maj. A. BOURGOIN" on
report for the Director
prepared by Lt. Col. W.S. Reid.
May 19-45*

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C

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FROM: _____

(Said) _____

EXT. _____

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Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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Raid

Director, OSS

May 11, 1945

Lt. Colonel Stafford Reid

Services rendered by Major Andre Bourgois in French Morocco
prior to American Task Force Landings

The G-2 Section of the War Department in a two weeks briefing course, prior to the departure of Lt. Colonel King and myself to North Africa in April 1941, had included a specific recommendation to penetrate into all ranks of French military and civilian personnel stationed or travelling through Morocco, with particular emphasis on employees of railroads, shipping companies, harbor and factory personnel to obtain military intelligence.

A garage in Casablanca on a direct road to Ain suburb, manned by members of the German and Italian Armistice Commissions attracted my attention a few days after arrival because cars of Axis identification were seen driving up daily to these premises presumably for engine and tire repairs.

To investigate, one morning, I drove a Consular car into this garage on the excuse of needed repair work and timed this opportunity to become acquainted with the owner of the premises, Captain Bourgois.

The interview disclosed he had been to America and had worked for a short while in one of our large automobile plants, and spoke fluent English and French. He obviously hated the Germans. He had for several years in Morocco been the representative of the Standard Oil Company, and through this contact had many close American friends. In addition,

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he was of an Alsatian family, all of whom were known for their strong anti German feelings. His brother was in Indo-China as an assistant commissioner working for General De Gaulle. Captain Bourgois had served with distinction in the first World War, and was decorated; he also served with French Colonial troops and the Foreign Legion in their campaign against the Moors for French control of Morocco.

He appeared to be a suitable prospect to use for obtaining information on movements of the German Armistice Commission and because of his acquaintance amongst local French Secret Service officials could in all probability furnish reports on French Quisling organisations operating in Morocco under the titles of "S.O.L." and "P.P.F." and the "Legion Des Combattants", and "Chantiers de Jeunesse".

I proceeded cautiously for a few weeks in developing this connection in order to check up and verify some of the local information he had passed along. Confidence increased rapidly as a result of the kind of information he was obtaining, and the daring manner in which he presented it. Casual inquiries concerning Bourgois, made amongst other groups in process of cultivation, disclosed the fact that numerous permanent residents of Casablanca of anti-Vichy sentiments who knew him or had used his services since the fall of France reported that he was an excellent business man, trustworthy and patriotic, whereas elements of French people who were pro-Vichy or apathetic to German occupation advertised him as a profiteer who overcharged customers, did unreliable work and was probably indirectly acting as a "Vichy" informant.

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During the early summer months of 1941, Captain Bourgeois and I worked out a plan to maintain a close and permanent watch on the movements of the members of the Axis-Armistice Commissions throughout the Protectorate. This plan was facilitated by the use of a truck repair service which Captain Bourgeois was operating up and down the whole coast of Morocco, from Iqualeh to Agadir and east to the Atlas Mountains and north to the Spanish frontier. He knew one or more garage owners and oil dealers of anti-Vichy sentiments in each of thirty scattered inland towns who could be called upon to furnish intelligence and implement the pattern we were creating to broaden the sources of supply. When this plan got under way, reports were collected by two Arab drivers in his employ whose records of loyalty were attested to by the fact that they had served with him during the Riff campaigns and proven their trust again and again in combat while serving under his command.

By August 1941, Captain Bourgeois was turning in reports recording visits of Axis members to this or that town; the date, the hour, the car number, passengers by description, and occasionally by name when such figures as Herr Amer, head of the German Armistice Commission, and other well-known top Axis figures were identifiable.

In spite of the fact that Axis cars were usually parked in local garages or in hidden alley streets, reports from Captain Bourgeois's chain would disclose the address of houses visited and valuable information as to the background of the occupants. The trucking service and contact with oil men afforded a means of obtaining information on

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French Naval port activities along the west coast because his vehicles had authorization entry and circulate freely between the jetties. However, after a year of this access to harbors, French Admiral D'Harcourt was replaced as head of the French Fleet in North Africa, and thereafter everything tightened up in harbor control and we were compelled to resort to other means of obtaining news of shipping movements and port activities.

During the period of indirect access to French ports, Captain Bourgain was able to furnish us with sketches, drawings of gun emplacements and general harbor fortifications that were inaccessible to direct examination. When new pill-box construction was undertaken we had this information almost immediately. Carefully chosen anti-Franch informants employed in these ports played a considerable part in supplying us with movements of the French Navy which included schedules of arrivals and departures of their destroyer and submarine fleets. If a convey of materials, consisting of phosphorous or native grain-vegetal or barrelled vegetables, got underway, this information scribbled on notes was carried back to our meeting place within a few hours time through Bourgain's chain and this type of information was cabled hundreds of times to the United States Navy via State Department code. Samuel King had developed an independent chain of contacts, and information of this character of intelligence was always cross-checked for agreement or errors prior to forwarding to Washington.

It would be needless to add that this officer was insuring very considerable risk, both to members of his family and himself, in being

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involved in a scheme of this sort if his participation could have been traced by hostile agents. In spite of all precautions exercised, three or four Frenchmen engaged in acting as informants in this chain were picked up, jailed, and one man paid the price of his life at an unguarded moment. Captain Bourguin escaped detection because of a chain of contacts who had no access to the anti-aircraft controls.

2. About September-October 1941, the American Consulate was receiving hundreds of American photographs forwarded by O.W.I. depicting factories and in great American bomber plants where long lines of war production was featured in assembly process, and together with these pictures were others depicting the simple American home life, happy children and their families, schools and playgrounds; photographs of congressmen and war industrial leaders. They were accumulating dust in a drawer and not being put to any useful purpose.

As French morale was extremely low and interfering with our plans to obtain French support prior to invasion, I proposed a plan to start a propaganda chain to the French people in Morocco and proceeded to select only those pictures which showed the importance of American war production. Pictures selected showed 100 tanks assembled outside of production plants or rows of heavy cannons and anti-air guns on assembly lines. Pictures were selected showing mass production of liberty ships, ships in great forests of scaffolding. Captain Bourguin pointed out that was the only kind of exhibit that would impress the French people. They had no interest in prominent American personalities at this stage of depression since the fall of France, nor in leading figures in the Government. We felt not to improve and solidify the morale of the French under-

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ground, anti-Vichy French in Morocco, and at the same time win over many doubtful citizens who indicated their skepticism of eventual German defeat by questions of this nature -- "Is America doing anything in big production yet?", "All foreign broadcasts are jammed," "The Moroccan press is completely Axis-controlled and we get no outside news of encouragement." In capitulation on this defeatist attitude we selected 100 of the most convincing photographs, backed and glued them together one night to form a folding chain telling graphically and chronologically the gigantic American war production effort. The English script was translated into French and pasted on the backs of these pictures. The job was done between ourselves and the help of American Consulate girls because of the danger of imposing this work to any French printer which would have resulted in imprisonment. We mapped out a campaign which covered a travel schedule of some 1000 kilometers involving five or six weeks. Captain Bourgeois had intimate contacts with at least one-third of the TV contacts of the French "Affaires Indigènes", centered principally in north Morocco and in the trans-Atlas region bordering the Sahara Desert. We set out on this journey with stop-over plans in all the coastal cities and from Agadir went south into the so-called "Zone d'Insécurité", controlled entirely by the French military. Captain Bourgeois again performed important services in getting our car into Chad sans without suitable passports, refused by the French, and enabled us to reach Guelma, 40 miles east of Ifni. On our trip down the coast from Guelma to Guelma, we made four night stops and in each place accompanied, through Captain Bourgeois's contacts with anti-Vichy

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French, more letters of introduction to other agents along the route of our itinerary. In each and every place we had visited so far, I observed that Captain Bourgois was on intimate relationships with a small number of Frenchmen who were fanatically opposed to German domination, and showed signs of willingness to help supply us with the type of information the War Department had asked us to obtain. From the area bordering Rio de Oro, we proceeded in due easterly direction along the Saharan side of the desert and crossed over the south Atlas Mountains until we reached the Lemba Valley where we proceeded along the basin in this fertile area making stop-overs only in such towns where Captain Bourgois was sure of his contacts. We found that the photographs were serving a useful purpose because wherever they were shown in our party with great difficulty that we succeeded in keeping up with our schedule of departure which required leaving before day-break each morning. After showing the exhibit to a few French people, they interested in collecting these groups of friends the following day to view them. They expressed interest and enthusiasm, and this delayed us. In some villages as many as 20 or 25 people including French officers and private citizens, pro-Vichy, and anti-Vichy, would assemble and carefully examine each of these prints and pressed with questions. These discussions gave an opportunity to determine the reaction of the French and the extent of German propaganda in these areas. We continued by the valley and entered the fertile region of the great date plantations where Captain Bourgois arranged contacts with Arab and French contacts who gathered at night in tents to examine and study these exhibits.

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On two or three occasions we were obliged on advice of Captain Bourgois's friends to leave an area ahead of schedule because the French authorities were catching up and we expected to be chased out before the job was completed. Captain Bourgois of course participated in a certain protection we would have been unable to give him if questioned by the French, due to the fact that I had never stated in Morocco as a State Department Vice Consul and my official reason for making the journey in this forbidden district was "to check up on the needs of the Arab population who were to receive American goods in accordance with the Economic accord recently established between Washington and Vichy." The excuse of having Captain Bourgois along was the necessity of having an interpreter speaking Arabic and knowing the route. After we returned from this extended trip, its success was discussed by Mr. Arthur I. Jones from the Charge d'Affaires, Robert Barber, in London who suggested the use of this exhibit and stated that he had told the French that the Americans were going to put down their hands by putting them behind an American car which he pointed to which he pointed to French Morocco. But during the discussion of the possible success of this, General Jones, he was surprised to find the French had no intention of allowing us to return from this trip if it seemed as how the US looked from various French people in Morocco who had heard of this exhibit and would to have a similar opportunity to view it. In order of the American Embassy, General, Mr. Robert Jones, I was instructed to disseminate during the trip because the Germans had put pressure on the French following the attack and followed by further stimulation of this propaganda.

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On two or three occasions we were obliged on advice of Captain Bourgois's friends to leave an area ahead of schedule because the French authorities were catching up and we expected to be chased out before the job was completed. (Captain Bourgois of course participated in a certain protection we would have been unable to give him if questioned by the French, due to the fact that I had never shown in Morocco as a State Department Vice Consul and my official reason for making the journey in this forbidden district was "to check up on the needs of the Arab population who were to receive American goods in accordance with the Economic accord recently established between Washington and Vichy." The excuse of having Captain Bourgois along was the necessity of having an interpreter speaking Arabic and knowing the roads. When we returned from this extended trip, its success was attested to by a letter I have from the Charge d'Affaires, Marrakech (Marrakech, in Tangier) who requested the use of this exhibit and stated that he had had reports from the French that the Americans were trying to influence French minds by showing them pictures of American war effort. He proposed to follow the same plan in Spanish Morocco, but owing to a protest from the Resident General in Rabat, General Nogues, he was compelled to stop the circulation. For two months after we returned from this trip we received no less than 100 letters from various French officials in Morocco who had heard of this exhibit and wished to have a similar opportunity to view it. On orders of the American Consulate General, Mr. Foster Marshall, I was instructed to discontinue showing this exhibit because the Consulate had put pressure on the French indicating they would not tolerate any further circulation of this propaganda.

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the following results were obtained from the trip:

- (1) Through Captain Bourgeois' connections with the French Military commands in North Morocco we were able to determine the size and strength of native forces under the command of French officers and were able to determine which elements would be faithful to Vichy and those who would be either neutral or sympathetic in case of an American invasion or might even render active resistance to Vichy orders.
- (2) We had no knowledge of what the planning group in Washington would adopt as Division routes through French Morocco if landings were attempted. It was important, however, in case of invasion, to determine the reaction of both French and native population to American intervention. The report on this trip gave some valuable indications.
- (3) Captain Bourgeois promised to some of the French officers at these headquarters that they would be of great help to the Allied cause by supplying us from time to time with information on German activities in their zone, any clandestine infiltration of German arms to natives, a record of vehicles and persons passing through their posts, and their activities.
- (4) The two Moroccan Regiments they were very interested in being advised as our headquarters requested of them. At that time was on the priority list of the units we produced. These great units were in the southern slopes of the Anti-Atlas mountains, but as they are located in the French militarized zone it was next to impossible for us to establish any chain of contacts in that area to receive or supply information on production and shipments that were taking place. Through Bourgeois' contacts, for a period of at least eight

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on the following (his initial visit we were able to supply Mr. Robert D. Murphy, then Consul of Morocco, with information dealing with attempted clandestine shipments of this mineral. In the month of January 1942 a heavy shipment of this mineral was spotted by one of Captain Bourgeois's contacts in a yard-siding along the Marrakesh railroad line. We chased north in a car that night to verify the report and secure the freight car numbers, and through our W/T contact notified our representatives in Oren who then remained on the lookout for the arrival of this shipment. The result was camouflaged in French gasoline billers and Eldeyway Knight and Leland Knuds reported the arrival of this mineral at the Port of Oren. Mr. Robert D. Murphy took the matter up in protest to the French Authorities in Algiers, and this mineral consequently never cleared the Port of North Africa for Marseilles and Germany.

(C) Captain Bourgeois thought it advisable to make contacts in the French Youth Organizations who were then partitioned in scattered camps in Morocco, because they were being poisoned by the roughest sort of Vichy propaganda.

(D) I covered one of the camps of the Chantier de Jeunesse and loaned our American propaganda photographs to one of the youthful members of this organization who in the course of 3 or 4 hours time had passed on this exhibit to the view of many members of their association.

(E) In the month of December 1941 Colonel Hely called me to Tangier and said he had received a mail circular set from the British on his recent trip to Gibraltar, and asked me to take it back to Casablanca and make arrangements to see if we could set up a communication

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system by linking up that station with Tangier and, if successful, at a later date by prepared to tie up Oren, Algiers, and Tunis in one chain. We broke through on the first contact with Tangier on the night of January 3, 1942, and with Colonel Rody's endorsement, I requested Captain Bourgain to assist me in clearing British W/T equipment across the border, for the British were anxious to set up an independent chain with their established agents in Morocco. Captain Bourgain made two or three trips at night with me to the Spanish-Moroccan frontier to bring their equipment across the border without opposition from the central stations. As the American consular cars were conspicuous because of their plate identification, on several occasions Captain Bourgain loaned me different makes of his cars to cover the areas in Morocco where British agents were prepared to set up stations. This was of inestimable help at that time because any movement for French cars would have created immediate suspicion in the part of the authorities, knowing that the American Consulate had their own agents.

After Colonel Rody had informed us beginning September 1942 that D-day for the invasion had been determined, I proceeded to approach Captain Bourgain with the idea of using his services and his son's to handle wireless traffic on the night of the invasion. I had set up four separate stations in Casablanca itself, the principal one being in the office of the American Consulate and the other three stations were for emergency use in the event the principal station could no longer be used. Captain Bourgain and his son realized the great danger they were exposed to in running the blockade of French troops and police when carrying

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messengers back and forth to me from one station or another for decoding and encoding during the landing operations. On Saturday night, November 7, 1943, Captain Bourgeois came to the cellar of the American Consulate and received his last minute instructions. I gave him a .45 automatic and he used his motorcycle as a means of transportation. The messages coming in from Gibraltar and Tangier were numerous that evening of Saturday, November 7, and they were brought to me continually during the few hours preceding the dawn attack of Sunday morning. For safety reasons we were using station no. 2 which was located in a fake carpenter shop created in the roof of a house situated a few hundred yards from the port, and within full view of the French Flagship "Jean Bart." Captain Bourgeois and his son had to cover a distance of approximately 1/2 mile from that station to our code room in the cellar of the Consulate, but after each visit the distance increased because of the necessity of changing the route. Towards 2 o'clock Sunday morning, the French radio cars (radio detectors) were tightening up on our station no. 2 which was being protected by a fireman in our employ. Captain Bourgeois fearing that his son might have been captured on his last trip carrying messages, (father and son alternated on the motorcycle), he set out on foot and returned at 3:35 and brought me the last message from Gibraltar Station concerning Signal Corps instructions to French Partisans under Colonel Buge's direction.

The risks that Captain Bourgeois and his son were exposed to on the night of the invasion by running the French blockade were enormous. We were told after the armistice on November 11 that the French Secret

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Service were told to pick him up at any price. In these critical times he and his son would have been dispatched on short order.

Five days after the armistice was signed in North Africa, a reliable agent informed us that two Frenchmen, pro-Vichy, had taken motion pictures of the American amphibious landings and intended to forward these clandestinely across French Morocco into Spanish territory to Gestapo headquarters at Oran. This agent informed us that the cans containing this film were in the possession of these two French agents who were living in a small hotel in Casablanca used as a hideout. I approached the S-2 Section, Colonel Percy Black, and was told to work out the capture of the film and the agents with Lt. Col. Parsons (S-2) and to select a reliable Frenchman who had supported the cause prior to 8th day to assist. I approached Capt. Bourgois and he took a hand immediately. We went to this hotel and through bribery to the concierge gained admission to the room occupied by these French agents and spotted a long thin box containing the films in question. We were tipped off that these Frenchmen had planned to get the 4 AM train from Casablanca to Fez-Meknes and then across the Spanish frontier. Lt. Col. Parsons, Captain Bourgois, and myself followed the landing of these films on the train in question and made certain of the actual departure of the agents on the same train. In a group of three automobiles consisting of American military police, those of Captain Bourgois's Arab gunners, we proceeded north to the frontier and arrived at Souk-El-Arba 1 1/2 hour before the train. Knowing that these French agents would be armed, Captain Bourgois, with no concern as to his personal safety, jumped aboard the train as it

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was coming into the station at Casablanca and took possession of the film and threw them off to the side of the tank, and in the meantime with the combined use of the American police detail and the Arabs, the two Frenchmen were picked up at the point of a gun in one of the cars and disarmed. We brought them back to Casablanca and the film was turned over to the Signal Corps for development. These pictures would have served a very useful purpose to the German Command as they disclosed our methods of beaching our landing boats and also the state of confusion that existed when the first line of Infantry moved forward across the beachhead.

It is my firm belief that this French officer rendered great service to the American cause both prior to and during the American landings, assumed risks beyond the call of duty, and I would like to see his efforts and reward acknowledged by a suitable citation.

W. Stafford Reid
Lt. Col., AMB

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WSR/ad

XXXXXX
Casablanca, Morocco
May 11, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

✓ J. Rives Childs, Esquire,
Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim,
American Legation,
Tangier.

Dear Mr. Childs:

Acknowledging receipt of your letter of May 7, regarding the loan of Reid's photo album on production, I am forwarding it herewith.

Due to the keen interest in this book in our area, we are anxious to have it back as soon as it has served your purpose.

Very respectfully yours,

✓ H. Earle Russell
American Consul General

9.8.42



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECRET

AMERICAN LEGATION

Tangier, May 21, 1942

Dear Staff:

Mr. Childs has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your card and of the binding, and to thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. Fifty francs are enclosed in reimbursement. An album of photographs for the use of this office is now being prepared.

Your booklet was sent down in the Tuesday pouch and I should like to tell you again of the great interest it aroused among the Spanish. Mr. Childs showed it to General Orgaz, Spanish High Commission, General Mugica, the Secretary General and to General Uriarte, the ranking Spanish official in Tangier. Afterwards it was passed about in less elevated but even more enthusiastic circles. If you will read the Legation's despatch no. 769 to the Department, a copy of which was sent to Casablanca, you will find reference to your excellent handiwork and to the testimonial letter you were good enough to forward here.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Paul

Paul E. Geier

W. Stafford Reid, Esquire,
American Vice Consul,
Casablanca.

SECRET


Vice Consul REID at Casablanca has put to excellent use the photographs which we have sent to the Consulate there, in selecting about 300 of the best pictures and arranging them in an album entitled "La Vague Ecrasante de la Production de Guerre des Etats Unis d'Amerique". The pictures are classified according to subject and in their ensemble give a brilliant idea of the marvelous strides which have been made by American production. This album has been circulated from hand to hand among contacts of the Consulate in Morocco, and to a slight extent in Algeria. It has everywhere aroused intense enthusiasm and admiration. X The translation of a letter recently received by Mr. Reid is enclosed herewith, exemplifying the wonderment and joy at seeing photographic evidence of American planes, tanks and guns actually pouring off the assembly line.

X The album has been shown to important Spanish officials, including General ORGAZ, Spanish High Commissioner for Morocco. They have all manifested the same amazed absorption. A similar album is now being prepared for permanent use in Tangier, for there is a long waiting list for the Casablanca copy. As a general observation on the photographs received, it might be pointed out that greatest interest is displayed in production and not personalities. A number of the photographs have appeal only for Americans, of whom there are very few in Morocco. It is the glimpses of mass production, the heavy guns, powerful tanks, the technical marvels in rapid ship construction and the incomparable planes being produced in ever vaster numbers, which truly demonstrate the might and power of the United Nations, which fire the confidence of our friends and make the doubters game in bewildered contemplation.

Respectfully yours,

J. Rives Childs
Charges d'Affaires
American Legation
Tangier

Legation Despatch # 769 Tangier



17206



MOBIL-SERVICE

A. BOURGOIN

328, Boulevard d'Anfa — CASABLANCA (Maroc)

C. C. Perleval Robot N° 171 80

Téléph. A. 43-03

R. C. Combinaison N° 7.800

Casablanca le 6 Mai 1942

- GARAGE
- STATION SERVICE
- ATELIER
- MÉCANIQUE
- PNEUMATIQUES
- ACCUMULATEURS
- EXCLUSIVITÉ
- DES
- PRODUITS
- DE LA
- ECOCONY-VACUUM
- SERVICE
- DE DÉPANNAGE

CONSULAT GENERAL
des ETATS-UNIS d'AMERIQUE
C A S A B L A N C A

à l'attention de Mr. W.S. REID

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur de vous remercier de la confiance que vous m'avez faite en me prêtant l'album de photographies, montrant pour la première fois au Maroc, l'effort gigantesque de l'industrie de guerre de votre grand pays.

Ayant eu l'occasion, grâce à votre obligeance, de le montrer à de nombreux français, je ne saurais vous décrire l'enthousiasme et en même temps la confiance que ces magnifiques photographies ont soulevées partout où j'ai pu les montrer.

D'après l'avis unanime de tous mes compatriotes, c'est la première fois que dans ce pays, les Etats Unis d'Amérique, ont pu réduire à néant la fable grotesque colportée par la propagande de l'Axe, fable suivant laquelle votre pays ne serait pas à même de rentrer en guerre effectivement avant la fin de l'année 43.....!

La vue de ces avions produits en série, des tanks fabriqués à la chaîne, des immenses chantiers de constructions navales démontrent l'inanité de telles allégations.

Des Officiers, des ingénieurs, des ouvriers, des commerçants qui ont eu cet album entre les mains ont compris, peut-être pour la première fois pour certains, la puissance colossale des Etats Unis. La vue des portraits des Généraux McArthur et Marshall ont montré les physionomies énergiques et résolues des chefs qui conduiront votre pays à la Victoire.

Il ne me reste plus qu'à souhaiter comme du temps des LAFAYETTE et des PERSHING de voir à nouveau notre Armée aux côtés de leurs frères d'armes Américains.

Espérant voir bientôt se réaliser ce jour je reste votre dévoué serviteur,

A. BOURGOIN.

14 June 1945

16,206

Bourgois

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

Attached hereto is a recommendation for the award of the Legion of Merit to Major Andre Bourgois.

The recommendation is based upon memoranda from Lt. Colonel Stafford Reid and Captain Callanan.

This recommendation has been considered by the OSS Board of Officers who have recommended your approval.

If you approve, will you please sign the recommendation and I will take it to the War Department Decorations Board in line with the usual procedure.

Frank L. Ball, Jr.
FRANK L. BALL, JR.,
Major, AUS
OSS Citations Officer
026

Attachment

signed & returned Hedberg, Ball
15 June 15.

SECRET

Exposure 15 125 0/8 10.5

Form 10 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

17 MAY 45

FROM

GORDON, C. SAINLANCA

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN: 13300

FOR ACTION

No. 206

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, F. SECT.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#1077.

109 FROM EMPIRE. RE YOUR #1557. (OUT: 11419).

MAJOR BOURGION NOW IN RAJAT AND IN GOOD HEALTH AND SPIRITS.
WILL RECONTACT HIM SOONEST.

✓
Told Major
Parable -
ETP
5/18

TOM: 1413 17 MAY 45

FILE COPY

SECRET

IT IS PROHIBITED TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 15 MAY 45

REC'D 1503 15 MAY 45

TO

GORDON, CASABLANCA

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT: 11449

DISTRIBUTION

INFORMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,
FIELD SECTIONTRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#1557. 109 TO EMPIRE.

SECRET

MAJOR BOURGOIN LEFT VIA ATC FOR YOUR CITY 21 APRIL.

PLANE REPORTED TO HAVE ARRIVED 22 APRIL. NO WORK OF HIS
ARRIVAL RECEIVED HERE AS YET. HAVE ASKED FRENCH MISSION HERE
FOR INFORMATION AND THEY SAY THEY HAVE TO WIRE FOR IT.

PLEASE GIVE ANY INFORMATION YOU HAVE ON HIS PRESENT.

END HEADQUARTERS.

SECRET

TODAY 1613 15 MAY 45

WJD/EUP

FILE COPY

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: 10/1/41 REG: 10/1/41 OUT: 10/1/41

TO: [illegible] PRECEDENCE: [illegible]

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CONFIDENTIALITY: [illegible] INFORMATION: [illegible]

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

*10/2/41
Burgin*

[illegible]

[illegible]

FILE COPY

SECRET

[illegible]

IT IS REQUESTED TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CASE
WITHOUT ANY MODIFICATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT.

MISSION MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE
AUX ETATS-UNIS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

No. 2548 /P

16,200
Belmont, Inc. 1714
TELEPHONE DEPARTMENT 7835
1750 R STREET

April 28, 1945.

Mr. Charles S. Cheston,
Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Cheston,

I greatly appreciate your courtesy in
sending me a copy of the commendation which was
sent to Major Henry E. A. Bourgois.

It is most gratifying to hear that
this officer has performed his duties in such
an able manner and that his services have
proved of real value to the Office of Strategic
Services.

Yours sincerely,



Marc Pilot, Lt. Col.,
Acting Chief of Staff,
French Military Mission.

R:KMcN.

Jn. Bruch
csc



10. 2. 11
 Bureau of Intelligence & Security
 10. 2. 11

21 April 1948

General A. B. Brossin de Saint Didier
 Chief, French Military Mission in the
 United States
 1715 R Street, N. W.
 Washington, D. C.

My dear General de Saint Didier:

On behalf of the Director of Strategic Services, Major General William J. Donovan, USA, I am enclosing the certified true copies of the commendation which was recently sent to Major Henry R. A. Bourgois, French Army.

As you know, he has served with this agency for the past four years, and during this period he has performed his duties in a manner as to reflect credit on himself and this agency. His devotion to duty and faithful service are particularly deserving of the highest praise.

Sincerely,

Charles L. Clouston
 Acting Director

Enclosure: 3

WJ:Progs

10. 2. 11

16,206

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 April 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation**TO : Major Henry E. A. Bourgein**

1. On behalf of the Director of Strategic Services, Major General William J. Donovan, USM, I wish to commend you for the superior manner in which you have performed your duties while associated with this Agency. Your devotion to duty and splendid cooperativeness are particularly deserving of praise.

2. For your military record it should be noted that you served with this Agency at the following stations:

- a. Greece, from January 1941 to 8 November 1943;
- b. Greece and Spanish Morocco, from 8 November 1943 to September 1943;
- c. Italy, from September 1943 to 1 February 1945.

/s/ G. Edward Duxton
G. EDWARD DUXTON
Acting Director

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

[Signature]
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
13 APR 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

OBS
Form 9 (Revised)**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**
OFFICIAL DISPATCH**DATE** 21 APRIL 45**FROM**

CASERTA, ITALY

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRETARIAT

DIRECTOR, FIELD SECTION, READ

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN-10049

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37860-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET****SECRET**

#45044. SECRETARIAT FROM COVINGTON FOR CROCKETT. RE YOUR #32374 (OUT-9398).

REUR 32374 (OUT-9398). NOT NECESSARY YOU FORWARD REPORT AT THIS TIME IF SECURITY INVOLVED. IF IT BECOMES URGENT THAT I OBTAIN REPORT WILL CABLE AT LATER DATE.

TOR: 1251 21 APR 45

FILE COPYIT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT**SECRET**

Form 10 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 19 APRIL 1945

REC'D 2331 20 APRIL 1945

TO CASERTA, ITALY

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

OUT 9398

CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

SECRETARIAT

DIRECTOR, FIELD SECTION, READ.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**
SECRET

#32374. CROCKETT FROM SECRETARIAT. REFERENCE YOUR #14164 (IN 10376)

REUR 14164 (IN 10376) HOLDING BOURGOIN REPORT UNTIL
RECEIPT ADVICE FROM YOU AS TO WHETHER ZINOV'S RECORDS SATISFY
YOUR REQUIREMENTS.HIGHLY OPERATIONAL CHARACTER OF REPORT MAKES FORWARDING
INADVISABLE UNLESS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL.

T001 2338 20 APRIL 1945

SECRET**FILE COPY**

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

(000)
Page 47 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 13 APR 45

FROM

CG, USAF, AFRICA, MET, CAIRO, EGYPT.

TO

WAR DEPARTMENT, CG, ATC, GRAVELLY POINT, VA.
~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 10145

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

TRANSPORTATION

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER
BIGELOW, FIELD SECTION, O'GARARECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

CONFIDENTIAL IVI

INX 48142. FROM RITTER FOR DONOVAN, GEORGE AND OPD.

USME-3-818 WDP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE CAIRO AIR PRIORITIES OFFICER FOR THE APRIL TRAVEL OF MAJOR H. E. ANDRE BOURGOIN, FRENCH ARMY. AUTHORIZATION HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED TO HIM FOR 55 POUNDS EXCESS BAGGAGE FOR TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT. BOURGOIN IS REQUIRED IN CASABLANCA BY THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES FOR AN IMPORTANT ASSIGNMENT.

ACTION: 055

INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD

CG-18-11000 (12 APR 45) DTG 121012

TDR: 0848 13 APR 45

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE COPY

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

14 April 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation of Major Henry E. A. Bourgoin
TO : Colonel G. Edward Buxton

1. Attached for your approval and signature is a proposed commendation of Major Henry E. A. Bourgoin, French Army, who is about to leave OSS to return to the French Army. He has been with the organization since January 1941. The commendation was drafted by the Secretariat at the request of Lieutenant Putzell.

2. The proposed commendation is desirable not only as an expression of appreciation of his services but also as a matter of military record for the officer concerned. Subject to your approval, the Secretariat will send certified true copies of the commendation to the French Embassy here, to our Paris office for inclusion in Major Bourgoin's military files at the office of the French War Ministry in Paris.

Attachment

Peter F. Pugliese
PETER F. PUGLIESE
1st Lieut., AUS
Secretariat

16, 206
CONFIDENTIALBourgeois, H.H.

12. April 1945

SUBJECT: Commendation**TO: Major Henry E. A. Bourgeois**

1. On behalf of the Director of Strategic Services, Major General William J. Donovan, USA, I wish to commend you for the superior manner in which you have performed your duties while associated with this Agency. Your devotion to duty and splendid cooperativeness are particularly deserving of praise.

2. For your military record it should be noted that you served with this Agency at the following stations:

- a. Warsaw, from January 11-41 to 8 November 1942;
- b. Warsaw and Spanish Warsaw, from 8 November 1942 to September 1943;
- c. Italy, from September 1943 to 1 February 1945.

S. EDWARD NIXON
Acting Director

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: APRIL 1945

REC'D 1441 6 APR 45 OUT 8208

TO: GUSTAV, CAIRO

PRECEDENCE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

(CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CONFIRMATION FIELD SECTION
INFORMATIONDIRECTOR, SE CRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELOW, FIELD SECTION,
SI, TRANSPORTATION, X-2, C'GARA.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

NO. 51227. ALDRICH FROM LEO. REFERENCE GILES NR. NI36162 (IN 6560).

16,206

1. MAJOR ANDRE BOURGOIN, FRENCH ARMY, NOW GOING CASABLANCA ONLY.
AND REFUSES HONOR HIS THROUGH APR TO ETO. 109 ANXIOUS BOURGOIN LEAVE
SOONEST.
2. REQUEST SOONEST TCA AND APR WITH 55 LBS. EXCESS BAGGAGE
CASABLANCA.

NOI 1000 6 APR 45

RECEIVED 1000

FILE COPY**SECRET**IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT.

✓
SECRET

16,206

Bourgoin, Wg. AH

24 March 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: *General Donovan*
~~Major Edwin J. Pritzell~~

FROM: Major Andre Pacatte

In talking to Major Bourgoin last night, the subject came up of his past connection with Socony Vacuum Oil Company. I know that General Donovan had something in mind which was connected with Standard Oil and I also know that Major Bourgoin would be very anxious to resume his connection with Socony Vacuum Oil Company. Wouldn't it be possible to bring this matter to the General's attention before Major Bourgoin is ready to go back to North Africa?

*Andre Pacatte*ANDRE PACATTE
Major, AUS

SECRET

Top ↑

OSS Form 4191

Date 3/22

To: General

Attached is draft reply to the
French Mission.

Do you not want to speak with
Bourgois and tell him of the deci-
sion before he hears it through
other channels?

green
yes of

Office of the Executive

(9041)

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

16 206
Bourgoin

22 March 1945

Colonel V. H. Morison
Chief of Staff
French Military Mission
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Morison:

I am in receipt of your letter of March 17th concerning Major A. H. Bourgoin, and regret exceedingly that your Headquarters in Paris finds it necessary to ask for his recall.

However, we are most appreciative of your kindness in making Major Bourgoin available to this agency during the past many months and we, of course, are taking steps to comply with your request. Major Bourgoin's services to this organization have been outstanding, and I want to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of all concerned for the effort which he has made on behalf of the Allied cause.

We are asking Major Bourgoin to report to the French Military Mission as you ask, and if we can be of further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to call upon us.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Top ↑

To: Mr. Shepardson

ten

is of

3/22/45

Director's Office

(3300)

Even 748. 74115

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

Top ↑

OSS Form 4251

Date 3/21

To: General

I talked with Bourgoin who suggests the attached cable.

EJP

To: Mr. ^{3/22} Stepanov ^{reen}
I will want 1965 of

& true &

Office of the Executive Officer

(Encs)

EJP

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

OBS FORM 1443

1621341

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES - OUTGOING MESSAGE			
DATE	21 MARCH 1945	PRIORITY	CLEAR TEXT
TRANSMIT TO	PARIS, FRANCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CODE OR CIPHER
DISTRIBUTION		<div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.5em;">SECRET</div> (STAMP CLASSIFICATION HERE)	
(CONFIRMATION TO)			
DIRECTOR		(INFORMATION TO)	

TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED

109 to Cable.

~~REMISSION~~ PLEASE CONTACT FRENCH MINISTRY OF WAR
G-1 AND ASK IF ~~IT IS~~ POSSIBLE TO KEEP IN OUR ORGANIZATION
MAJOR H. E. A. DOURGOIN WHO HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BY A CABLE
SENT TO FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WASHINGTON TO DIRECTION OF
POLITICAL AFFAIRS MOROCCO. AS YOU KNOW HE HAS DONE MOST
VALUABLE WORK FOR US. WE WERE PLANNING TO USE HIM IN WORK
IN WHICH HE IS ESPECIALLY QUALIFIED. APPRECIATE EVERY EFFORT
TO OBTAIN REVERSAL PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIS RETAIL.

INITIALS OF RELEASING OFFICER

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SECRET

(STAMP CLASSIFICATION HERE)

OSS Form 2202

S E C R E T

FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	For'd.		
1. Chief					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

From the Files of the Director

Case Return

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

S E C R E T

↑
Whitney Thompson

↑
Please let
me know
what
reply should
be

From the files of the Director
Please Retain

19 March 1945
2:30 PM

16 2156-
BourgoisTELEPHONE DECATUR 7925
1759 R STREETREPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
MISSION MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE
AUX ETATS-UNIS
WASHINGTON D. D. C.

March 17, 1945.

No. **1659** /PMajor-General Wm. J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th & E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Donovan,


Reference is made to my letter No. 916/P dated February 13, 1945, and to your letter dated February 26, 1945, concerning Major A.H. BOURGOIN.

I regret to tell you that I have now received an order from our Headquarters in Paris stating that Major Bourgois must proceed to North Africa immediately.

Would you please therefore arrange that, insofar as the Office of Strategic Services is concerned, Major Bourgois's situation be placed in order. When this has been done, would you kindly arrange that he report to the French Military Mission.

I hope that, since the receipt of my letter No. 916/P mentioned above, Major Bourgois has been able to complete the work he was doing, and that his departure will not inconvenience you too much.

Yours sincerely,

V.W. Morizon,
Colonel, Chief of Staff,
French Military Mission.From the Files of the Director
Please Return

OBS
Form (8-1-44)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 13 MARCH 1945

FROM HQ. COMZONE, ETO, USA, PARIS.

TO WAR DEPARTMENT

~~DISPATCHED TO THE SECRETARIAT~~

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 7394

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

TRANSPORTATION

*Bass, Jean, Andre 16,206*DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,
BIGELON, FIELD SECTION, SI, O'GARA.RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHERCONFIDENTIAL CUM
CONFIDENT

E 20324. SIGNED EISENHOWER TO ATC FOR ACTION, ATTENTION IRELAND FOR
DIRECTOR, O. S. S. REOURAD EX17324.

AIR PRIORITY ISSUED TO CAPTAIN ANDRE BOURGOINE, FRENCH
ARMY, FOR HIS TRANSPORTATION TO THIS THEATER HAS BEEN AWENDED TO
ALLOW HIM TO STOP AT CASABLANCA. HE IS NOW ON DUTY WITH O.S.S.,
WASHINGTON.

ACTION: OSS

INFORMATION: CG, AAF, OPD.

CU-IN-14851 (14 MARCH 1945) DTG 131958Z

FILE COPY

TOR: 0914 15 MARCH 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

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Form 89 (Rev. 1-45)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 6 MARCH 1945

FROM

HQ, COMZ, ETO, US ARMY, PARIS, FRANCE

TO

SEE BELOW

~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN: 6608

FOR ACTION

(FOR INFORMATION)

TRANSPORTATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,
BIGELOW, F. SEC., O'GARA.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

16-57549-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER CONFIDENTIAL IVI

TO: CG, ATC, GRAVELLY POINT, VA.

ACG, ATC, EUROPEAN WING, LONDON, ENGLAND

WAR DEPARTMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

REX17324. SIGNED EISENHOWER HQ. ETOUSA TO AGWAR. INFORMATION: ATC.
ATTENTION: IRELAND. EDATC, LONDON FOR DIRECTOR, OSS.

US-ET-2-2526-USG-MAR HAS BEEN GRANTED TO CAPTAIN ANDRE
BOURGOINE OF THE FRENCH ARMY, NOW WITH OSS IN WASHINGTON, FOR AIR
TRAVELING TO THIS THEATER WHERE HE HAS BEEN ORDERED FOR DUTY BY OSS.

* AS RECEIVED.

ACTION: OSS

INFORMATION: CGAAS

CG-III-7270 (7 MAR 45) DTG 062345Z

TON: 1710 7 MAR 45

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE COPY

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FORM 8-59 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 6 MARCH 1945

FROM

CG, USAFINE, CAIRO, EGYPT

TO

WAR DEPARTMENT: CG, UK BASE SECTION, LONDON,
~~X DEPT OF DEFENSE X~~ ENGLAND

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IH 6560

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

WAR DEPARTMENT

TRANSPORTATION, ~~CG~~, *Shepardson*
DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, DAGRUDER,
BIGELOW, FIELD SECTION, O'GARA

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37531-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER CONFIDENTIAL "IVI"

CONFIDENTIAL

#ND 36162. GILES TO DONOVAN, OSS, OPD, AND EISENHOWER.

MAJOR H.E. ANDRE BOURGOIN IS AUTHORIZED TO STOP IN CASABLANCA
TO CONFER WITH OSS ON HIS WAY TO ETO. THE PRIORITIES OFFICER FOR
ETOUSA SHOULD AUTHORIZE THE APR FOR THE WHOLE TRIP.

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: OPD
INFO: OSS
CG-14-7013 (7 MAR 45)

TON: 1137 7 MAR 45

FILE COPY

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Form 63 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

2 MARCH 1945

REC'D

1824 2 MAR 45

TO

SEE BELOW

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

BOOK NUMBER

3 STATIONS

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

FIELD SECTION, TRANSPORTATION,
MAGRUDER, SECRETARIAT, BIGELOW.

U. S. CONSULAT FOREIGN OFFICE 0-10783-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

49777. TO GUSTAV, CAIRO (OUT 5298).

8864. TO PARIS, FRANCE (OUT 5299).

SECRET

12274. TO USTRATIC, LONDON (OUT 5230).

ALDRICH, CAIRO; GAMBLE, PARIS; FROM CHESTON.

INFORMATION: CASEY.

MAJOR H. E. ANDRE SORGOIN, FRENCH ARMY, WORKED WITH OSS
IN MTO PAST 2 YEARS AND WAS ONE OF MOST EFFECTIVE ORGANIZERS AND
OPERATORS OF CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE CHAINS IN ENEMY TERRITORY,
NOW URGENTLY NEEDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PENETRATION OF GERMANY FROM
ETO. MUST RETURN VIA CASABLANCA WHERE WILL MAKE SHORT STOPOVER.
ALDRICH PLEASE OBTAIN TCA AND APR TO CASABLANCA, GAMBLE TCA AND
APR CASABLANCA TO ETO.

TOD: CAIRO 2101 2 MAR 45
PARIS 1926 2 MAR 45
LONDON

CRC/EJP

SECRET

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICE

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16,206
Bourgois, Ha.

26 February 1945

Colonel V. M. Morrison
Chief of Staff
French Military Mission
1725 B Street
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Morrison:

In the absence of General Donovan I am writing to thank you for your letter of 13 February 1945 concerning Major Bourgois. We are grateful for your cooperation in extending permission to Major Bourgois to complete his work with us.

I am sorry that I cannot accurately forecast how long his services will be needed. As soon as the question is clarified I shall let you know.

May I again express our thanks for your generosity in this matter.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Form 44 (Rev. 1-54)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE <u>21 FEB 45</u>		REC'D <u>1848 20 FEB 45</u>	
TO <u>DI TRAVIC, LONDON</u>		PRIORITY	
FROM <u>OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES</u>		ROUTINE	
DISTRIBUTION		DEFERRED	
CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR		OUT-4366	
DIRECTOR <i>[Signature]</i>		SECRETARIAT	

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#10174. 109 TO FORGAN, CASEY AND ROLLER.

BOURDIN AVAILABLE FOR ASSIGNMENT MENTIONED YOUR #11454
(IN-4933) AFTER COMPLETION DUTIES IN WASHINGTON AND LEAVE TO VISIT
HIS FAMILY IN CASABLANCA. WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR DUTY APPROXIMATELY
MARCH 20, REACHING YOU FROM CASABLANCA.

Germany X

WID: 1951 20 FEB 45

WAD; EJP

FILE COPY

SECRET

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

DIS FORM 4001a

Date 2/14/45

General Donovan

Your cables on the
subject are attached.
1) Gable (A. Bone
referring to 1/5/45 7

Planned 45 men
known what is
known about BS.
S.
Director of the Capitalist

16,204
Boulogne, May 1944
SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT****TO : C. S. Cheston, Assistant Director****DATE: 21 February 1945****FROM : Security Officer****SUBJECT: Issuance of Badge to Major Andre Boufgoin**

In answer to your request I am outlining the circumstances surrounding my failure to issue Subject an OSS badge.

In the simplest terms the Subject has not been issued a badge because no request for its issue was ever made to this office until yesterday when Lieut. Thrum made such a request on behalf of the Director. It is the policy of this office to require a written request from the Branch Chief involved in all cases other than those of routine employment in the Washington Office.

By way of background, the following facts may be of interest. Upon his arrival in Washington, Capt. Crockett sent to this office a memorandum from the Security Officer, MedTO (copy attached) which, you will note, suggests a certain degree of caution in dealing with the Subject. Capt. Crockett did not come in to discuss this memorandum prior to his departure on leave nor did he transmit any special instructions from the Director concerning Subject's treatment. I assumed that Capt. Crockett was familiar with the contents of the memorandum as he carried it with him personally.

On 1 February, Col. Early called me to find out how Subject could get a badge. I inquired to what Branch Subject was assigned and upon being informed that the Branch was SI I told Col. Early that a badge would be issued upon the written request of Mr. Shepardson. I thereupon telephoned Mr. Shepardson who stated that he did not wish to authorize a badge for the Subject without the approval of the Director and asked that I do nothing about it pending the receipt of a formal request. Mr. Shepardson stated that he would discuss the matter immediately with Col. Early which I understand he proceeded to do. As stated above no request was forthcoming.

On 9 February a representative of X-2 discussed with a representative of my office the Subject's status and indicated that the X-2 Branch was not very happy about Subject's presence in OSS Washington. X-2 was informed that Subject's status was that of a visitor and under these circumstances X-2 indicated

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

that it did not wish to pursue the matter.

On 19 February Capt. Crockett discussed with me my reaction to a recommendation which he said he intended to make to the Director for the use of the Subject in the Far East. I told him that I was not in favour of such a recommendation as I do not believe that as a matter of principle intelligence officers of other armies and of completely foreign background should occupy staff positions in this organization.

I greatly regret having failed to carry out the Director's wishes in this matter but I respectfully submit that in view of all the circumstances both I and the other members of OSS involved were acting for the best interests of the organization in not issuing the Subject a badge without the Director's specific authorization.



A. van Beuren
Security Officer

SECRET

SECRET

SN-447

16.206

Bourguin, May 1944

HEADQUARTERS
 2677TH REGIMENT, OSS (PROV.)
 APO 512, U. S. ARMY

AA-24575

28 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Capt. Andre Bourguin - French Army
 TO : Security Officer, Washington, D. C.

1. Subject is leaving this Theater 28 January 1945 and proceeding to the United States in the custody of Capt. David C. Crockett, Finance and Fiscal Officer for this Theater, on Temporary Duty Orders. This memorandum will be delivered to you by Capt. Crockett, and a copy thereof will be forwarded by regular pouch.

2. Subject has been in the employ of this organization since the time of the North African landings, and has been one of our most active chain leaders in Italy from the time of the landings here until his departure. He has contributed a considerable amount of valuable service and is highly regarded by many people within the organization. However, this feeling of admiration is not universal. He has been looked upon with suspicion and distrust by many other officers attached to this Command, and has unquestionably constituted a Security problem in many respects.

3. The attitude of the Security Branch here toward the Subject can be summed up as follows:

It is believed that Subject is unquestionably loyal to the Allied Command, and there is no reason to suspect that he has permitted his natural loyalty to France to take precedence over his voluntarily assumed loyalty to the United States. On the other hand, such natural loyalties cannot be overlooked in any true evaluation of Subject's services.

The view expressed above is supported by the fact that at the present time the French Army is attempting to have Subject returned to its jurisdiction for investigation and possible prosecution on a charge of desertion arising out of his desertion by, and continued service with, this organization.

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Page 2 - Security Officer, Washington, D. C.
26-1-45

Entirely apart from these considerations, Capt. Bourguin has been notoriously indiscreet in his behavior and has consistently refused to cooperate with the Security Branch or to comply with Security Regulations. In addition, he has from time to time surrounded himself with doubtful characters of equal indiscretion. While it is improbable that during his stay in the United States he will be in a position to do much harm, it is the opinion of this office that he should be carefully supervised, with a view to preventing him from committing Security violations of a serious nature. It should be remembered that Subject is a person of international experience and undoubtedly has many friends and acquaintances in America.

4. It is because of the French Army's present attempt to regain custody of the Subject that he is being sent to Washington, inasmuch as he could, were he to be returned at the present time to the Securite Militaire, give those authorities a great deal of information which might prove compromising to this organization.

5. This office has also been informed that as a reward for Subject's services certain persons connected with the organization in Washington will attempt to secure for the Subject a post-war reinstatement in his pre-war position as representative of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey in Morocco and other French North African territories. Also, during his absence in the States the Command here will attempt to bring about in Subject's behalf a reconciliation with the French military authorities.

6. This information is forwarded for your files, and to enable you to take any supervisory steps which you think necessary. I suggest a conference between your office, Capt. Crockett and the Chief of the SI Branch, to which Branch the Subject will be assigned while there.

G. G. P.

G. G. PARRY, JR.,
Lt. Comdr., USNR,
MEDTO Security Officer.

SECRET

SECRET

Page 2 - Security Officer, Washington, D. C.
 98-1-45

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6. This information is forwarded for your files, and I advise you to take any supervisory steps which you think necessary. I suggest a conference between your office, Capt. Bennett and the Chief of the SI Branch, to which Branch the Subject will be assigned while there.

L. G. P.
 G. G. PARRY, JR.,
 Lt. Comdr., USNR,
 MEMPH Security Officer.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

16,206
Burgoyne, Maj. AH

20 February 1945

Mr. Archibald Van Buren

Lt. Thrush

Major Andre Bourgoin

This will confirm my telephone conversation in which I relayed to you the request today made by the Director that an OSS badge be issued to Major Andre Bourgoin.

Robert Thrush
Assistant to the
Executive Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: 15 FEBRUARY 1949
FROM: USTRAC LONDON

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

DIRECTOR

FOR INFORMATION

SECRET//SIAT

48. The following table shows the number of people who attended the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, by country.

تلفون: 07968433

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S E C R E T

SECRET

H451. 109 AND FISTERS FROM FOREIGN CASEY AND ROLLER.
IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXTREMELY HIGH CURRENT PRIORITY
ON THE DEEP PENETRATION OF GERMANY THE SERVICES OF
ANDRE BAUMGARDNER URGENTLY NEEDED HERE. UNDERSTAND HE
NOW IN WASHINGTON AND AVAILABLE. PLEASE ADVISE
SOONEST.

I approve this and

SECRET

FOI 0005

19 FEB

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Col Bourgois

16.2.22

Bourgois, Mr. C.H.

17 January 1945.

MILITARY RECORD OF CAPT. HENRY EMILE ANDRE BOURGOIS

with the OSS.

1. First Period between October 1940 and 11th of November 1942. Having been in an American oil company for 15 years (Socony Vacuum Oil Co.) I was in touch with the American General Consulate of Casablanca and I knew personally all the American consuls in charge of the consulate since 1928. After the 10th of June 1940, I contacted Mr. Gould and Mr. Quincy Stanton and offered my services to these gentlemen in order to supply them any informations which might have been requested by the State Department.

In May 1941, after having contacted Mr. White, the American Minister in Tangiers, I met in Casablanca Messrs. David King and Stafford Reid "Vice Consuls". I immediately started to work for these gentlemen putting at their disposal all the contacts I had with the Army, Navy, Air Force and the government officials in Morocco. During the same period, I was also in touch with Messrs. R. Murphy, Culbert, Bartlett, Coster, L. Rounds, C. Coon, G. Brown, Bagby, Mayer, Coles, etc. My oldest son was also working in close contact with the above named gentlemen working with the OSS and State Department organizations. At the same time, I was working for the French 2^d Bureau, insuring the liaison between this organization and the American representatives of the OSS.

2. Second Period from the 11th of November 1942 to the 1st of May 1943.

During this period on the advice of Mr. Stafford Reid, I worked most exclusively for the CIC of the Western Task Force, General G.S. Patton, Jr. G.O., and more particularly under the orders of Lt. Col. W.B. Parsons. Thanks to General Patton's intervention, I was mobilized in the French Army on the 30th of December 1942. General Patton assigned me to a Special Detachment and always under the orders of Lt. Col. W.B. Parsons, I joined the 5th Army which was in formation in the last days of January 1943. Although working for the CIC, I was also in touch with the OSS, through Mr. C. Coon, passing agents into Spanish Morocco and gathering military informations from the different contacts I had all over the country.

3. Third Period from 1st of May 1943, to the 9th of September 1943.

Lt. Col. W.B. Parsons' outfit being split up between the 5th and the 7th Army, I was assigned by Col. Edwin B. Howard, G.S.C. C of S G-2, 5th Army to OSS duties.

pub
CH

2.

During the aforementioned period, I principally worked for Mr. Carl Coon in Orda and Gordon Brown in Pes, gathering military information on the Spanish zone and counter-espionage on the nets of enemy agents in the Spanish and French territories of Morocco. In June I passed directly under the orders of Mr. Donald C. Downes.

4. Fourth Period from the Salerno landing to present date. Under the orders of Mr. Donald C. Downes and as a member of his Attachment, I landed in Italy at Paestum and after having worked in Analfi, I arrived in Naples on the 1st of October 1943 and was assigned after my arrival in this city by Col. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr. to the long range Intelligence Section. Not having been regularly assigned by the French Headquarters of General Girard to the American Army and being considered as an observer for having joined the Fifth Army landing operations in Italy, although I had in the month of August told the French Special Services of my intentions to follow my outfit, Col. Ellery C. Huntington requested through General Mark W. Clark a regular assignment to the French Headquarters in Algiers. This assignment was issued by a note No. 13169 E.M.G.G./BFR. dated 1st of October 1943. I was assigned from the 27th Escadron du Train, to the 27th Escadron du Train, to the 26th Escadron du Train, at the disposal of Col. Eddy. This order was communicated to me by the French military mission attached to the Fifth Army under note No. 294/M/ dated 3rd of December 1943.

(Signed)

H. E. A. BOURGON
Captain, F. A.
Area No. 3

Received true copy.

[Handwritten signature]

16, 2005
17 January 1945.

Dear Capt. Crockett:

I am sending you herewith my military record which you requested this morning before leaving Siena. This military record takes care only of my services with the American Army (CIC, Western Task Force, and our organization OSS).

(Signed) H. E. A. Bourgois

Yours sincerely,

(written by hand)

The doctor changed his mind and wants to wait and see Major B.M. Carvo - - So, I have not sent his medical record.

H.E.A.B.

Certified true copy.


J. Murphy, Capt. FD.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1945

REC'D 1721 17 FEB. 45

TO: USTRAVIC, LONDON

PRIORITY

ROUTING

DEFERRED

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT: 4:19

DISTRIBUTION

FOR INFORMATION

RE: REPRESENTATIVE TO COORDINATOR

DIRECTOR, DOERING, MAGRUDER.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SYMBOL: BARRY (FOR AF/001 AND J1/001)

SECRET

THESE INDICATE IN WASHINGTON. BEING CONSIDERED FOR NEW
 MANAGEMENT PETS. IF YOU HAVE DEFINITE REASON TO BELIEVE HE
 WOULD NOT DO FURTHER WORK FOR J-ONE FROM YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND
 EXPERIENCE IN LMS OPERATIONS, CABLE PRIORITY FACTS AND REFER-
 ENCE TO J-ONE CONSIDERATION HERE.

SECRET

FEB 17 1945

JB RFR LMS RAP

FILE COPY

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
 WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

MISSION MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE
AUX ETATS-UNIS
WASHINGTON 25 D. C.

16206
TELEPHONE DECATUR 7935
1759 R STREET

No. 916 /P

February 13, 1945.

Major General Wm. J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th & E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

This is to let you know that I have just received a telegram from Paris informing me that Major A. H. Bourgois was reassigned several months ago to his former branch of service - the Transportation Corps - and had been ordered to report to his post in French Morocco.

I hope this will not inconvenience you too much.

It goes without saying that I shall be pleased to extend permission to Major Bourgois to complete the work he is now doing under your supervision.

Would you be kind enough to let me know when it will be possible for him to be placed at our disposal again.

Thanking you in advance for your co-operation in this matter, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

V. H. Harrison
V. H. Harrison,
Colonel, Chief of Staff,
French Military Mission.

R:eg

No. 916 4 /P

February 13, 1945.

Major General Wm. J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th & M Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

This is to let you know that I have just received a telegram from Paris informing me that Major A. M. Bourgois was reassigned several months ago to his former branch of service - the Transportation Corps - and had been ordered to report to his post in French Morocco.

I hope this will not inconvenience you too much.

It goes without saying that I shall be pleased to extend assistance to Major Bourgois to complete the work he is now doing under your supervision.

Would you be kind enough to let me know when it will be possible for him to be placed at our disposal again.

Thanking you in advance for your co-operation in this matter, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Signed: V. M. MORIZON

V. M. MORIZON,
Colonel, Chief of Staff,
French Military Mission.



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 11 JANUARY 1945

FROM CASERTA, ITALY

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN: 956

(FOR ACTION)

DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRETARIAT, SHEPARDSON, FIELD
SECTION, MACRUDE, X-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

SECRET

#2501A. 103 TO 106 AND 154.

CAPTAIN BERKOWITZ HAS DONE A GOOD JOB BUT HIS USEFULNESS HAS BEEN ENDED AS A RESULT OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE WAR AND THE FACT THAT HE HAS BEEN BLOWN BY THE PACATIE REPORT. INDEED HE MAY BE IN DANGER AS A RESULT OF THAT EVENT. IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO RETURN HIM TO WASHINGTON EITHER TO WORK THERE OR TO BE RELEASED. HE SHOULD BE TREATED WELL AND AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE IF HE DESIRES TO HELP HIM RETURN TO HIS OLD JOB AS MOROCCO REPRESENTATIVE OF STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY. HE MAY BE OF FUTURE USE TO US IN MOROCCO. CAPTAIN BERKOWITZ WILL ACCOMPANY HIM TO WASHINGTON.

*Class with 920-
early to handle*

SECRET

11 JANUARY 1945

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068
Form 47 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 30, 1944

FROM

EXDET, ALGIERS

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 16018

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT.

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37863-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#45164. For Donovan from Glavin through Algiers. In reference to your #5145.

Putzell will receive an introductory report on the Rome check-up from Crockett. Using Bourgoin to highest degree. The final report on this matter will explain Bourgoin expenses.

✓
SECRET

TIME: 7/30/44 8:07 PM

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OSD
Form 42, Rev. 1-41

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 21, 1944

REC'D 7/21/44 5:44 p.m.

TO

HQSST, AIRSTERS

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT-13752

DISTRIBUTION

CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1941-47000-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#51454. For Glavin from Donovan.

Please advise me in regard to Bourgoin. Has there really been some question on the matter of finances? It is right to check on this, but in addition make a thorough investigation of his operational qualifications, and if they prove to be good, make certain that we use him to his best advantage, provided the Board's check on the Rome affair does not prove that it is not advisable to use him.

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SECRET

JUN 7/21/44 6:47 p.m.

WJD:RE

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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SECRET

15,997
T. L. Frank

28 December 1944

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Award of the Legion of Merit
to 2nd Lt. Frank W. Bobb.

TO: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D. C.

1. It is recommended that the Legion of Merit be awarded to 2nd Lt. Frank W. Bobb for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services.

2. One of the very important requirements of the Office of Strategic Services was the development of clandestine reproduction methods, especially a small camera susceptible to several different types of camouflage. None of the cameras then manufactured were found to be of use in the secret activities of OSS. The requirements for a new type of camera were handed to Lt. Bobb. Through his exceptional ingenuity, efficiency and energy, this officer developed a camera which is the finest clandestine camera ever developed. Because of the simplicity of operation and design, the results obtained have been superior and have contributed immeasurably to the efficient execution of the assigned functions of this agency.

3. Lt. Bobb was a First Sergeant during the period covered by this recommendation - March 1943 to 6 December 1944.

4. This recommendation is based on my personal knowledge, the reports of this office and the attached recommendations and interviews.

5. It is believed that Lt. Bobb's achievement is distinctly outstanding and more than worthy of the recognition requested.

6. A sample of the camera is enclosed, accompanied by a sample negative and prints developed therefrom.

7. The entire military service of Lt. Bobb, both prior and subsequent to the time of his distinction has been honorable.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Bolling, Lt. Col.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Charles S. Cheston
FROM : Colonel E. F. Connely
SUBJECT: The Lt. Colonel Bolling Case

DATE 23 November 1944

*Talked to
Connely
who understands
case*

The disposition of this case has been very embarrassing to both OSS and to Colonel Bolling. Briefly the situation is this. Our Administrative Services started negotiations for the services of Colonel Bolling without using FPB. The first that FPB knew of this illegal recruiting was yesterday when Colonel Bolling came in to see me saying that he had been to call on Colonel Livermore, who is a family connection, he found Livermore gone and talked to Lt. Lanier and told him his plight. Lanier suggested that he come and see me.

His statement was as follows: He had had several discussions with Mr. Ream and Mr. Mayo and they had gone so far as to say that they had a specific job for him and wanted to know how soon he could be released from the Air Corps. He made the necessary contacts and even stated to Mr. Ream on what day he could report when he was told by Mr. Ream that unfortunately a change was necessary as an OSS officer had arrived here on the rotation policy and that it was up to OSS to give that man the job.

Colonel Bolling asked me if there was any reason to doubt this story, I told him there was no reason that I knew of, but that I would discuss the matter with Mr. Ream. He then asked if there was anything else in OSS that might be of interest. I told him there were two important jobs, one in Paris and one in London in connection with intelligence work but that frankly we were trying to procure the men from within our own organization since time was important and we did not feel we would recruit from without and take the time necessary to indoctrinate. Colonel Bolling asked me also if in addition to the fact that an overseas officer had returned I would find out if there was anything more to the matter than Mr. Ream disclosed. He said if there was something wrong with his records or him that he would like to know it. I then talked with Mr. Ream, he confirmed the fact that Colonel Stoen was back from overseas and he said also that from his recent talk with Air Corps he had gotten some derogatory information and would have changed his mind anyway. All this could have been avoided if Services had put in an SOI and let us do the investigating and it is reasonably sure that we would have submitted well qualified candidates but candidates whose security we could be quite sure of and who would be the type of men that would be hard to get away from the Air Corps. Personnel clash at time and it is quite possible that Ream checked with some officer in the Air Corps who did not like Bolling. Certainly the same thing could happen here. FPB doing the investigating would have it on a better level and would get a fairer opinion in my judgment. I don't know what action you want to take on this but I did feel it proper to bring it to your attention.

E. F. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETWAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 November 1944. ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Donovan.

I am sending you a copy of the report on operations in the European Theater which I mentioned to you at our conference today.

This report was written by Dr. David T. Griggs, a member of the Advisory Specialist Group working on General Spaatz's staff out of this office.

Thank you very much for the conference today and the many courtesies you and your organization have extended in the past.

Edward L. Bowles

Edward L. Bowles,
Expert Consultant to
the Secretary of War.

*My congratulations to you on the magnificent report
submitted in the summary paper - it is most gratifying*

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
ADVISORY SPECIALIST GROUP
APO. 633.

17 October, 1944.

Dr. E. L. Bowles,
Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War,
Room 4B936, Pentagon Building,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dear Ed,

During the rapid advance of our Armies across France, radar played a relatively small role. The weather was good, the day to day movement of our forces was fantastically fast and uncoordinated, and the radar sets in general lacked sufficient mobility and organic transport to keep up with the very front lines, the air fields at which the fighter-bombers were based were distant from the battle front, communications were always poor and often lacking, targets for the fighter bomber attack were out of range for fighter control sets even had they been at the very front, because of the prevailing good weather and good visibility close support aircraft were almost always able to navigate to their target or to the rendezvous with the columns for which they were providing support; hence radar aid of navigation was not vital. Because of the fluid nature of the war, targets were very largely targets of opportunity, discovered by the eye and bombed almost immediately. Missions thus were not of a type which lend themselves to detailed operational planning or to close control from ground stations because of the difficulty of communication and because of the ability of the pilots to pick out their own targets with greater efficiency than could anybody on the ground.

The prevailing notion over here is that our Armies stopped at the border of Germany not primarily because of materially increasing resistance but because of the failure of our supply lines. In short, Patton ran out of gas. The 584's ran out of gas. The MEW was short. And so it goes. The MEW did, however, render yeoman service primarily in plotting the action of enemy aircraft and controlling interception, or in some cases action against enemy aircraft on the ground. The 9th TAC MEW is credited with the destruction of approximately 160 enemy aircraft from D day until the first of September. The 584's lagged behind the front lines further than need be. I am told, however, that the situation was such that even had they been at the front lines or with our advance elements, targets would have presented themselves only rarely.

In general, the situation was that the Germans would

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Page 2. - Ltr. to Dr. Bowles.

leave behind small rear guard detachments and would try to move the bulk of their army and other equipment on roads ahead of our advance elements 50 + 100 miles from our front. This presented targets of opportunity but they were fleeting targets and plans for attacking them could not be laid hours in advance. They were discovered almost entirely by tactical reconnaissance aircraft and by armed recon. As you know, Tac R aircraft are unarmed P-51's and P-38's equipped for visual reconnaissance and photography. Their defense is purely speed and maneuverability deriving from their light weight. Armed recon, on the other hand, is the term applied to normal fighter-bomber aircraft bombed up and loaded with ammunition, which are dispatched to cover a specified area and to attack what they find immediately calling in to Fighter Control Center by radio to report targets which they have discovered that are beyond their own power to cope with. In only a few isolated cases, such as the Falaise pocket and the motor vehicle concentration south of the Seine, was there a sufficiently stable situation to permit planning of missions more than an hour or two in advance. In the Falaise pocket the 584's were moved up into position and they performed four night missions. Even here movement of the ground troops was so fast that on most of the occasions when the aircraft were vectored to a target and they dove to attack, they were warned by flares from the ground that they were attacking our own troops.

This whole phase of the campaign is a tribute to the visual acuity and the individual initiation of the fighter pilots of the Ninth Air Force. They were for the most part quite on their own. Very small control was exercised by the Fighter Control Center. The predominant exception being attack on enemy aircraft. Perhaps 30% of their missions were directly controlled from the ground by the air support party officers but here again the ultimate recognition of the target was entirely visual by the pilots. Over and over again German prisoners have testified to the hawk-like vision of the American fighter pilots.

The weapons of this warfare were: First and foremost the machine gun. The eight 50 cal. guns on the P-47 comprise a weapon of terrific destructive power. They were all that was needed to cope with light artillery installations, mortar positions, motor vehicles, horse drawn artillery, and occasionally they even got medium tanks. Favorite ammunition is the armor piercing incendiary. The weapon of second potential importance in destructive power is the high velocity rocket of Lauritsen. This is ideal against tanks, pill boxes, heavy gun positions and other specialized targets where accuracy and penetrating power of a medium-size charge is the best destructive factors. The third weapon is the 500 lb. GP bomb dropped from various altitudes and various angles of dive all the way from a high angle 3-4000 ft release on well defined

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SECRETPage 3. - Ltr. to Dr. Bowles.

objectives down to low-angle skip bombing on less well defined objectives. This weapon was particularly effective against concentrations of tanks, defended positions, railroads and bridges for which it has no substitute. You will see, I have listed these in order of decreasing number of rounds that can be carried as well as in order of decreasing accuracy. Much can be done to make bombing more accurate but it will never take the place of machine gun fire for the reason that you can only carry two bombs and there are many targets which are very vulnerable to machine gun fire and on which it is not profitable to waste a bomb. Although the average bombing accuracy of the fighter bombers is set at approximately 750 feet by Larry Taylor, this appears not to be a Gaussian distribution and actually there is quite a lot of very accurate bombing which is why it is possible to destroy individual tanks and gun emplacements. This does not meet the eye and is one thing that radar must compete with if we are to try to replace visual bombing by blind bombing. The other thing is the pilot's individual ability to locate targets visually since this is the only way we have of finding the bulk of the targets.

The situation is now quite different. The lines are more stabilized, the opposition at the front is heavier, the weather is worse, communications are better, things move slowly enough so that planning in advance is possible and the commands and crews are more experienced in the use of radar. In the everyday operations of the Tactical Air Commands, radar is now playing an important role. Often nowadays the fighter bombers go out only to find themselves over 3-7/10 cloud cover in the target area. If they fail to navigate to their rendezvous point or to their target in the first sweep they frequently get lost and fail to locate their ground control unit or their pre-arranged target. The radar control personnel is now bringing to a rather high state of perfection an opportunist operating procedure. Both MEV and 584's receive the daily field orders. They know what missions to expect and approximately when. They know the call signs of the airplanes and of the ground control parties. They know the coordinates of pre-assigned targets. They are now very largely concerned with plotting these individual flights as they come into the target area. By watching the tracks and listening to the VHF, it is readily possible to determine whether the fighters have navigated properly to their area, whether they have made visual contact with the ground control teams, and whether they have discovered their targets. In an increasing number of cases one of these three things is not achieved within a reasonable time. If at the end of 5 or 10 minutes the mission has not gone as planned, the MEV or 584 will break into the VHF channel and ask the fighters if they need help. In an increasing number of

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Page 4. - Ltr. to Dr. Bowles.

cases the fighters willingly admit their need. The WEI and/or the 584 then takes over and vectors them to the target area. For this purpose the 584 has proven to be much the most useful piece of equipment because of the fact that it keeps a constant plot of the position and track of the aircraft. I will illustrate some of the points I have made here by stories later on. Another feature of the present war is that night movement by the Germans is playing an increasingly important role as is night-fighting, primarily artillery fire. The desirability of having aircraft under the control of the tactical air commands available to throw into a tactical situation at night is becoming increasingly apparent to all concerned. I will detail to you later how this problem is being approached.

Now a word about the general Army situation on the Continent. You must take every thing that I say here as subject to confirmation since with the dispersal of commands and the difficulty of communications, it is hard for any of us kibitzers to get the real picture of an organization which is changing so rapidly that one almost is forced to the opinion that no one person really comprehends the organization in existence at any one time.

The 9th. Army has now taken its place in the front and is supported by the 29th. TAC under the command of General Nugent, whom you will remember from the anti-submarine days and who remembers you cordially. The 6th. Army Group has, of course, been in full operation on this front for a considerable time. It is composed of the 2nd. French Army and the 7th. American Army, and is supported by the 12th. TAC of Gordon Saville, which is now under the Ninth Air Force.

The basic unit of each of the TAC's is now five fighter-bomber groups. In addition to this, Gordon Saville now has two groups of French operated B-26's. His situation is a little confused because he has three French fighter wings and two American fighter-bomber groups instead of the normal five groups. Opie Weyland has in the 19th. TAC a squadron of A-20's equipped for night photographic work, none of which Edgerton has fitted with his flashlights. Pete Quesada has, in addition to the five groups, two P-38 groups which are used as fighter-bombers, high-level precision bombers with drop-noots, escort for the Eighth Air Force, and night intruder missions. He has also one squadron of P-61's (so also does Weyland now, I believe). Each tactical air command is to have a tactical reconnaissance group and at least the 19th, 12th, and 9th. now have these groups in operation. There is some talk of providing one group of A-20's to each tactical air command for night intruder missions.

The Eighth Air Force is still operating entirely from the UK and so far as I know there is no plan to move over

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even their fighters for some several months. Their MFI will, however, be moved over within a few weeks, communications permitting, to a site between Brussels and Liege where the normal range of control of fighter bomber rendezvous and fighter interceptions will extend to Osnabruck, Kassel, Frankfurt and Mannheim. Their range with 10 cm beacons in the fighters will include Hannover, Gotha and Stuttgart.

AEAF has dissolved, as you know, and Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory has gone to Asia. The bulk of the personnel of AEAF has been transferred to the newly established air section of SHAEF, which will perform much the same function at the SHAEF level as it formerly did as AEAF. It is my understanding that USSTAF will still control directly the operations of the American Strategic Air Forces. There is another new change in the wind which is the establishment of a provisional air force working with General Devers' 6th. Army Group. This is dictated by the policy of having a tactical air force to work with each Army Group. At the moment there is no high level representation of the Ninth Air Force Headquarters with the 6th. Army Group. I understand that General Royce is to command this and that it will be composed of two tactical air commands one American and one French, and a bomber command.

The tactical air command is being forged into a real instrument for close cooperation with the armies. The control of operations is completely decentralized to the four TAC's, each of which operates in juxtaposition with an Army headquarters. Missions are planned with complete cooperation between the ground and air officers, and it seems to me that the harmony of action is growing every day. The types of missions that they engage in I will list with an attempt to classify them in order of decreasing priority (at the moment).

1. Armored column support, as I have described to you in previous letters, in which fighter-bombers rendezvous with a task force and hit targets either designated by the air support party officer or ones of immediate military importance to the task force which the fighter-bombers discover themselves.
2. Isolation of the battlefield by interdiction of railroads, destruction of bridges, and general attack on all road and railroad traffic.
3. Armed reconnaissance in which a group or squadron of fighter-bombers is assigned a specific area generally close to the front lines in which they are instructed to attack any target of military importance.

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4. Tactical reconnaissance, both visual and photo-reconnaissance. In addition to the discovery of military installations and other targets for attack by the tactical air force and the provision of briefing material by fighter-bomber attacks, these tactical reconnaissance missions and the armed reconnaissance missions provide the Army with an astonishingly large section of their intelligence on the deployment and movements of the enemy ground forces. Another major function they perform is the accurate and frequent survey of enemy air fields within the tactical area which provides us with an enviable knowledge of German disposition.

5. The fighter offensive against enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground. This I list in decreased priority simply because the enemy air offensive, while fluctuating, has been fairly low for the last six weeks, though it has shown a tendency to increase lately.

6. Night fighter defense against enemy aircraft and night intruder missions.

Excellent communications and coordination with the Army make it possible for these tactical air commands to hit targets of opportunity which would be completely impossible for the more unwieldy operations of the 9th. Bomber Command or the Eighth Air Force. This includes such things as motor vehicle concentrations, tank armies, German command posts, rail traffic, and reinforcing columns moving toward the front.

To bring you up to date, I will outline the general radar situation in the 9th. Air Force as it exists today:

1. Two MEW's are in operation with the 9th. and 19th. TAC's. They are both operational at sites 10 or 15 miles from the front and are being given an increasing share of the operational control of fighter-bomber missions.

2. Two SB4's are in operation at the same site just south of Aachen. Four more are being readied for the 9th. TAC. It is reported that two are on the Continent destined for the 19th. TAC, and one for the British 2nd. TAF.

3. One SCR-584 modified for single-legged Oboc control is now being readied for operations with the pathfinder squadron of the 9th. Bomber Command.

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4. Two MK II Obco ground stations are now installed on the Continent and will be operational any day. One is southwest of Charleroi and the other is, I believe, near Chaumont or Dijon. Their range now is equivalent to that of the B-26's which are presently based approximately 100 miles behind the front.
5. One APS-13 is now operational in one of Harold Edgerton's A-20's. The 20 sets which were requested for this purpose months ago have been lost somewhere on route. They did not come as Allen Hazeltine thought with Lt. Parker, who arrived here approximately a month ago without any knowledge as to their shipment.
6. At least one SS Loran set is installed in one of Edgerton's A-20's. The whole squadron is to be fitted as quickly as the sets can be procured.
7. Some low altitude radar altimeters have been used in night intruder P-38's by Quesada.
8. Two squadrons of P-61's with SCR-720 have been in operation for some time. Because of the low scale of enemy night activity these are being increasingly used for night strafing and intruder missions. We lost one over enemy territory the other night while I was at the 584. He apparently was shot down at a German airdrome when he went in low to attack. The 720's are not operating at a high level of efficiency on the whole, and it is Sam Simmons' view that this is due in large measure to the lack of sufficient spares. 10 cm AI beacons are not yet, I believe, operational at the P-61 bases.
9. Two Micro-H ground beacons for short range operations of the Eighth Air Force are now in the theater, and should be operational in something like a month. One AN/UPH-2 is now installed in a war-weary P-47 of the Eighth Air Force, has been tested with excellent results on the Greyfriars MEW, and is to come over here shortly for trials in simulated fighter-bomber missions with the MEW and the 534's.

I have recently spent considerable time with the 19th TAC and Opie Weyland, with Gordon Saville, and with Peto Quesada. I have missed General Vandenberg each of the several times I have been at his various headquarters. Without any attempts at coherent organization I am going to set down in narrative form the impressions I received during these visits.

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The most fascinating thing, of course, about Weyland's operations since D-day is the fantastic month of August when his airplanes in large measure made possible General Patton's remarkable drive across Franco. This end run had an exposed flank which must have scared every strategist. As Patton swept along the north bank of the Loire he left no detachments to protect his right flank. Then this drive from the Brest Peninsula began, he called Opie Weyland in and said straight out "I am going to depend on you to protect my right flank with your airplanes. From now on you will do the worrying about my flank".

The good weather of August made it possible for Weyland to do this and brought about the epic defeat of what amounted to a German Army south of the Loire, which was frustrated at every turn, prevented from moving to attack Patton, and battered to a pulp every time it tried to organize for battle. Some 30,000 Germans south of the Loire were capable of driving into Patton's rear and forcing him to turn a large fraction of his force about to meet them and thus perhaps causing him to lose his opportunity of pursuing and destroying the German forces retreating before him. Weyland used his aircraft in classic fashion - he spotted the German troops early in the game, hit them hard enough to convince them that it was unprofitable to move at all in the daylight, then withdrew his fighter-bombers for a while, just keeping enough Tac R ships over the area to watch the German dispositions at all times and enough armed recon to keep the fear of God in these German troops.

For approximately three weeks the German commander tried by night to move his divisions up to cut Patton's flank. He was not fast enough because of Patton's speed, and it became clear that if he were to save his army he must head back for the German border. Here he began moving in desperation in the daytime. Weyland's boys pounced on him again and literally cut his forces to ribbons. The German commander all this while had not been engaged by any sizable element of ground forces. He saw towards the end of August that his position was hopeless and he surrendered in fact to an enemy air force. His sword was taken by a corps commander of the 9th Army who came down from Brest for the occasion and who had had no contact with the battle; but the German General made no bones about the fact that he was surrendering to Opie Weyland's air force. And as you will remember, he asked that to preserve the German honor, Weyland's airplanes should fly over his units in the days immediately preceding the laying down of their arms.

An amusing incident occurred while I was at the 19th Tac MEW. They had two P-61's under their operational control that night. While their primary target was enemy aircraft, they had been forewarned that an enemy counterattack was expected

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just north of Nancy. They were asked to direct an airplane to that area and stooge him around to see if he could pick up any action on the ground. He went down to 4,000 feet and shortly saw quite a lot of artillery fire. He was directed to go down and strafe it. He gave a lot of squirts from his guns and cannon but he was reluctant to go too low altitude partly because it was an unfamiliar job and one that that type of airplane has not been used on very much. So he came back with the story that he didn't think he had accomplished anything but he did go down and give them a few squirts. The MEW boys thought nothing of this and were only disappointed by his failure to get down low and do a real job.

The next day I flew into the air strip at Etain and bummed a ride into town with Major Stiller, who is one of General Patton's aides. He found out by questioning that I was interested in radar and he immediately started to tell me about a very interesting use of radar that had happened the night before. At 11.00 p.m. a furious artillery barrage was laid down on the command post of the 3rd. Division. The Division Commander immediately called Patton in person and asked him to get airplanes in to fix it. Patton called Wayland at 11.15, who reported that he had P-61's under control of the MEW and would see to it that they were vectored to that area. This command didn't get through to the MEW but in the meantime they had vectored the P-61 on their own initiative as I have described. The Division Commander reported that at 11.30 the 19th. TAC airplanes appeared, thoroughly strafed the enemy artillery and silenced them so that they didn't open up for the remainder of the night.

Wayland is very convinced of the importance of psychological factors in the operation of ground troops, both ours and the enemy's. For this reason he is willing to put up with a large measure of inefficiency as we learn how to use airplanes at night because he is firmly convinced that the very fact that enemy airplanes are known to be flying overhead is a major factor in demoralizing ground forces and preventing night operations or movement. As an example of how aircraft can affect the moral of our own forces, he cited an instance in which an armored task force was prepared to jump off on a major attack. They somewhere got the idea that the woods in the valley before them was infested with enemy tanks and they refused to go ahead with the attack until our aircraft had cleared the tanks out of the woods. Wayland ordered out a squadron who searched the length and breadth of the woods in vain for enemy tanks. They searched diligently for over an hour but found only a few small detachments and gun emplacements. These they strafed and then went back to base. Our task force stood on the hilltop watching these P-47's buzz over the enemy and seeing their tracers go into the woods. When the P-47's left they went forward with joy in their heart apparently with the conviction that our air-

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craft had completely destroyed the enemy which was holding them up.

When I was at the 19th TAC the MEW had only been in operation for about a week, yet it was being given a sizable fraction of the fighter-bomber missions for control. It is manned by an excellent crew - the same which performed so creditably against the buzz bombs on the south coast of England - but it was first installed in a terrible site, - more of that later. One mission General Weyland told me about, which in his view pays for the whole effort that his command has put into radar: On a day of very low ceiling and bad visibility, the enemy opened a fierce counter attack against the 3rd. Army with a great concentration of armor. Weyland was asked in desperation by General Patton to put his airplanes into the battle, although every one recognized the weather was such that it was a very dangerous mission. A group of P-47's was controlled by the MEW, directed to the target area, and instructed to let down. They, with admirable courage, went down through the overcast, breaking out at about 500 feet and came out on the "damndest tank battle they had ever seen". The Germans had not thought it possible that our fighter-bombers could operate in that weather. They were, consequently, deployed in the open, without attempt at aerial camouflage and so were sitting ducks. The fighter-bomber attack destroyed a great deal of the armor and threw the rest of it into utter confusion by the surprise of their attack. This is credited by the ground commanders with breaking up the rather large scale counter-attack.

A few days ago I spent three days at the 9th, TAC, mostly concerned with problems of the 584. As you know, we asked Larry Taylor to lend the services of Roland Larson for the 584 problem. Larson has been living with the set and his attention, coupled with the fact that General Quosada took violent action after his inspection tour (which was made as a result of the report Louis and I submitted to him), has resulted in a complete change of attitude on the part of the 584 crews and now for the first time the 584 is an effective instrument in the operations of the 9th. TAC. Please remember when criticism comes to your mind for the delay in this that the 584 was not adapted to the very rapid move following the break through at Saint Lo. The following stories will illustrate how the 584 is now being used.

At 6 o'clock in the morning every day, the 584 controllers get the field order for the day's operations of the 9th. TAC. They immediately go over it and plot the coordinates of all targets for missions which lie in their control range, and they make up a tote board with the times, target co-ordinates,

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call signs, etc., of each individual mission. They then endeavor to lock on to the leader of each group or squadron which they consider to be most important at the time. A plot of position with identification is passed on to the next from the ME, which aids them greatly in pick up. They verify this by constant check and recheck with the VHF/DF on normal transmissions from the aircraft. As soon as a leader has identified his target or made visual contact with the ground party he is working with, they relinquish him and lock on to the next most important unit. They monitor the VHF transmissions of the aircraft and whenever possible the air support stations. Thus they are able to tell by plotting the track of the aircraft and by listening to his transmission whether or not he is in trouble finding his target. As soon as it becomes abundantly clear that he is lost or in difficulty, they break in and ask if they can be of assistance. Usually their services are required only to guide the aircraft to the target area where the pilots are able to locate themselves or their targets by breaks in the clouds. On clear days this service is seldom needed, but in the broken overcast that we have been having lately, it is frequently of vital importance. I watched two such assists and the boys described several more to me with tracings of the plots to illustrate just what had happened. General Quesada told me three instances, the first two of which are illustrative and the third amusing:

A fighterbomber group was lost above 5 - 7/10 cloud. The air support party officer in an armored column gave them a target in coordinates near a town of obscure name. The fighter leader could not locate it on his map. The 584 was monitoring the VHF and by this time had locked on to the aircraft. The 584 then called to ask if they could help, and were answered "Yes". The 584 directed them to the target area, told them to circle. They could not find the target visually nor could they see their armored column, but they asked for red smoke on the target. The task force artillery fired red smoke shells which were immediately picked up by the fighterbombers who then were able to distinguish gun emplacements in an enemy strong point and bombed them with good effect.

The second story is, as General Quesada puts it, a perfect example of instrumentation. Two heavy batteries were shelling one of our armored columns. They were invisible to our ground units but their location was plotted by sound ranging. The weather was bad so that when fighter support was requested, the ME navigated the fighter bomber squadron to the front area and turned over control to the 584. The 584 carried them to the immediate vicinity of the target and informed the leader that the target was directly under his left wing 500 yards away. The fighter pilots could not detect any target. They were vectored back and forth over these batteries for many sweeps but they still could not pick out the batteries. Continually

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the 584 would inform the pilot of the exact position of the target with reference to the airplane. Finally the batteries opened up and the pilots saw the flash of the guns. They went down immediately and bombed and strafed the points from which these flashes came. By ground report the two batteries were knocked out and the army rolled on. The fighter leader, Colonel Young, said later that the batteries were so well camouflaged that they would never have been able to pick them out without the aid of the 584. All this done when the visibility was very poor so that they could not even have remained in the area by visual pilotage.

The third story is one related by an air support party officer who heard an aircraft calling for targets. Although the call sign of this aircraft was unfamiliar to him, his unit was in need of help and he requested aid from the fighter. When the affirmative answer came through, he gave the target coordinates and location with reference to a small town. The pilot could not find this town on his map and so asked for its location with reference to a larger town. Still the pilot could not find it. The air support officer then said it was 40 miles south west of Cologne. After a few moments of silence, the pilot replied "I can't help you, Bud, I'm in Italy". You might tell this to Jay Stratton as an example of anomalous propagation.

The 584's have been used on many missions to control night intruders who are vectored down roads or railroads on the chance of picking up a visual target. This, of course, accomplishes two things: It discourages the Germans from using the roads at night simply by the fact that an airplane is there, and secondly, if the Hun has any lights or if the moon is such that vehicles can be discerned, it permits reasonably accurate visual bombing and strafing. If the pilot is unsuccessful in locating any targets, he is vectored to a fairly large target such as a marshalling yard or a built up road intersection, and his bombs are released blind by the 584. There is to date no evaluation of the combat accuracy of this bombing. However the fighter pilots are as a whole enthusiastic about the accuracy and they come back with stories of having seen their bombs hit right in the middle of the road, etc. etc. Jack Taylor, 9th TAC Combat Ops, and Quesada, were cooperative in a plan to assess the combat accuracy of the 584 by daylight bombing with a photo ship accompanying it to make strike photographs. The first of these missions was run October 14 at my request. The photo ship aborted just before they got to the target, the fighter bomber continued and dropped his bombs, but it was 10/10ths overcast and he was unable to see the strike. I talked with their Combat Ops today and learned that a total of 10 of these missions are now planned so that we should have a good appraisal of the effectiveness of this bombing. In

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addition, while I was there, Quesada arranged to have Harold Edgerton's night A-20's vectored along the primary roads and railroads from Aachen to Cologne, taking strip photographs. The first mission is reported to have been successful and should again provide considerable evidence as to the efficacy of the 584 control. This night photography will be continued because it is vital to the Army to have accurate observations of night movement of the enemy.

In the Ninth Air Force we of ASG and BBRL are trying to put first priority on the problem of making the fighter-bombers more effective during bad weather this winter. As we presently see this problem, it is three-fold: 1, the aircraft must be provided with better facilities for bad weather landing; 2, navigation from base to target area must be completely controlled by radar; 3, blind bombing by the 584. The biggest difficulty in bad weather missions, I am told by everybody, is that the fighter-bomber is not a good instrument airplane. I hope that the GCA equipment may make it possible for them to fly with safety in much worse weather than they can now. However, this is a controversial subject and can only be answered after we have had many flight tests on GCA with average pilots in the combat area. I am hoping that we can get one or two of the first GCA sets over here shortly for tests of this sort.

The MEW and other radar plus normal homing facilities are adequate for navigation from base to target area and back. The tests in the 9th TAC will provide an answer to the efficiency of the 584 in bombing without visual reference on the ground. It has already proved its worth in leading the fighter-bomber to the target through broken undercast.

I rather believe that if we can get enough blind landing equipment over here, this overcast bombing technique can be utilized to great avail for close support this winter.

I have recommended that all airplanes that fly at night over here be equipped with APS-13 and SS Loran.

Quesada has pictured to me a concept of aerial war this winter which seems to me to have very great possibilities. He firmly believes that if the effort were put into it, fighter-bombers almost unaided could win the war in Germany this winter. The 3th. Fighter Command should move immediately to Belgium or Holland near the front lines. Fighter-bomber missions should be run all winter in any weather in which it is even moderately safe to fly. By this means, it is possible to attack 2500 targets a day rather than the few which we now hit. The whole fighter force should be sent out in units of two's over all of Germany. They must fly low and under the overcast, because of their speed and ability to take care of themselves in combat.

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They will drop their bombs on the first target of consequence that they see: bridges, railroad station, factory, residential center, ammunition dump, air field, etc., etc. They will be attacking, on the average, undefended targets and therefore will be able to come in low and do a good job of bombing. Then they have dropped their bombs, maybe accounting for two targets per pair, they then continue to fly to their radius of action. As they go along they will strafe everything that moves on the roads-- every train, every factory, every nerve end in the complex of German industry. In this way each pair of fighters should be able to do effective damage to five targets per mission. This is a form of attack against which Germany is powerless to defend herself. She can camouflage her airplane factories or put them under ground. She can put smoke screens over her vital targets to protect them against attack of the heavies. She can conceivably put into effect means, some of them known to us, which may decimate our heavies. But she cannot camouflage or put all her industry under-ground. She cannot defend all the individual units of her industry by flak. She cannot prevent the complete collapse of transportation and morale under repeated day-in-day-out attacks from fighter-bombers which may be expected to strike anywhere at any time, with practically no warning. She cannot alert her whole country so that they may take shelter against these hit and run attacks.

We have seen the blow to morale which the few German hit and run raiders caused in England as they swept across the coast and a few miles inland. We can imagine what confusion may be caused by 1500 fighters roaming at will the length and breadth of Germany on every day that the weather permits contact flying. Pete Quesada thinks, and I am inclined to agree with him, that now at this crucial moment such an attack would cause the German nation to crumble. He has seen for the last several months the efficiency of these tactics against the Germans in France. He has seen roads literally swept clean of any movement, even bicyclists. He has seen German air fields and units destroyed piecemeal by fighters which struck without warning. He has seen the ability of his boys to take care of themselves in individual combat with the enemy in far superior numbers. He has seen first Rommel and then Von Kluge hunted out in their lair by the fighter-bombers and both mortally wounded. He has seen the ability of our individual fighter pilots to go out on their own and accomplish the most extraordinary feats of destruction without briefing. We have all seen Opie Weyland cause an army to surrender in the field by what was in fact a pitifully small number of fighter-bomber missions.

We now have in the Theater and in Italy the largest collection of fighter-bombers the world has ever seen. We hold in our hand the tool which in the face of stiffening German resistance to our land armies can cause the collapse of internal Germany, which will stab these armies in the back and make our job of conquering very much less costly. Such a tactic would make an impression on the mind of every German which he would

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never forget and which would live in the memories of his children and grand-children as an illustration of the fearfulness of war, so that perhaps we might be spared the job of doing it again.

Larry Henderson just blew in this moment from the Mediterranean and the three of us will want to get together and write you more about everything. I want to say now that we here are in a quandary about the MEW's. The MEW has proved itself a most essential part of the tactical air command. We now have two MEW's in four air commands. Vandenberg asked Spaatz and Doolittle with greatest urgency to give him the Greyfriars MEW. Doolittle, after careful consideration, decided that it was too vital to the operations of the 8th Air Force, and I am inclined to agree with him. With their set on the continent they can assure that the 8th Air Force may go at least as far as Kassol and Frankfurt without opposition from the German Air Force. We now have adequate fighter protection but the Germans have been able to catch us with our guard down too often because of failure of fighter-bomber rendezvous. This will never happen with the MEW able to see the two formations. Further, any German formation that appears will be jumped by our fighters long before it has a chance to form up and attack our bomber formation. German jet aircraft have so far been not invulnerable to attacks by our fighters. The MEW's of the 7th and 19th TAC's can provide material aid to the 29th TAC between them. Gordon Saville has nothing but 270's and 527's. The 6th Army Group and the provisional air force should have the Corsica MEW which has been made mobile by Mike Chaffee and is in fact the best field MEW in this Theater. Larry Henderson confirms Louis' and my conviction that the military usefulness of the MEW in the Italian Theater is small compared to that on the western front. Larry goes further and says there is nothing the MEW can do for them that can't be done by two 615's. This MEW, the 584 for close support now in the MTO, and most of Saville's fighter-bombers of the 12th Air Force have been retained by Gen. Cannon and by Benny Chidlaw in the face of what appears to me very much greater military necessity on the western front. It is my personal conviction that if the fighter-bombers of the 12th Air Force and the MEW were moved up to the western front, and if the fighters of the 8th Air Force could be based near the front, the destructive effort on Germany could be stepped up in tempo to the point where it would very shortly become unbearable. This involves major problems of logistics, but here the Air Force can be quite self-contained. By the diversion of all the troop carrier aircraft from both Theaters to carrying gasoline, ammunition, and supplies, it would appear to me to be possible to solve this. Our C-47's here have just finished flying in half of the overcoats for the ground armies. They supplied an important fraction of the gas to our armies during September. If cold calculation shows that all the C-47's we can muster are insufficient then it is possible to devote a couple of wings of B-24's from the 3th or preferably the 15th Air Force to the job of carrying supplies. With the 15th Air Force now able to hit only the southern fringe of Germany and Austria, this would seem to me to be a very much more profitable employment.

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I am writing you these things because we seem to be about stymied in this Theater since no one here has real control over the ITC, and since this whole concept of fighter-bomber attack on Germany at the expense of the heavy bomber effort is one which could easily be decided in Washington, but which is difficult for the commanders of the strategic air forces to undertake.

Sincerely,

/s/ Dave

Encl.

In connection with the problem of BEFL-ASG-ORS activity in the Theater, I had a good long talk with Larry Taylor the other day and I found him wholeheartedly in sympathy with Louis' and my concept. He is willing to play ball on all the points which we have written you, and has already demonstrated this willingness by making available for jobs that we recommended the services of his two best radar men. He would, in fact, be willing and happy to accept appointment in your Office if this seemed desirable to make the organization click.

It has developed that the problem of siting an MEW for close support operations is by no means as simple as most of us had thought. The two desirable features, viz., 1, low-angle coverage, and 2, not many permanent echoes beyond 10 miles, are difficult to achieve in the same site. We have found it necessary over here to make very careful study of contour maps to pick out desirable regions, then to go to the sites and measure by transit the screening angle as a measure of low-angle coverage, and then to set up a mobile micro-wave set to measure the extent of the PE's. This procedure has been used successfully in siting the 19th TAC MEW which was originally placed in a very poor spot. It is recommended that a standard part of the MEW convoy be a light weight 10 cm set such as the HR with a big dish. After the MEW is sited the controllers should sit down and draw up a contour map based on the above angle measurements and on the PE's observed on the MEW of the coverage they can expect to get on airplanes at all altitudes. This map should become a part of the fighter control center operational information.

Capt. Andrews related a story to me. During the early weeks after D day the MEW was used more and more for control of fighters against enemy aircraft. These aircraft were controlled also

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Page 17 - Ltr. to Dr. Boyles. **SECRET**

by the fighter control center-- call sign "Sweepstakes"; the two FDP's, call signs "Sweepstakes Able" and "Sweepstakes Baker", and the MEW, "Sweepstakes Charley". One day Andrews ran into a bunch of fighter pilots who had been controlled frequently. These boys thought that all four of the controllers with various call signs sat in one big room and they had come to the simple and logical conclusion that Sweepstakes Charley was just a little smarter fellow than the other three so they had come to call on him for help more often.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Lt. Putwell

SECRETARIAT

DATE: 23 October 1944

FROM : Lt. Colonel Roberts.

7 9/22
1944 OCT 24 AM 9 56

SUBJECT: W. K. Bossard

On 18 October you requested that this office review the file of Mr. W. K. Bossard with a view to his possible assignment to OS3. This file has been referred to SI for their consideration. It will subsequently be submitted to I-2. However, his age and experience in civilian life do not appear to be particularly appropriate for assignment in any branch other than possibly MO, who have already indicated that they cannot use him.

P.R.

P.R.

Bauman, Chas. 15,045

Ltr. 1st Air Force, Mitchell Fld, N.Y., dtd 24 June 44, subj:
Participation of Troop Carrier Command in Combined Air Defense
Field Exercise

5th Ind.

Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C., 9 August 1944.

For Lt. Colonel Charles C. Bowman, 2281 Que Building

Thrust: Chief, Secret Intelligence Branch

The enclosed letter and indorsements are forwarded for your
information and files. The commendations contained therein are
most gratifying to this office.

G. Edward Suxton
Acting Director

*P.C. forwarded to Lt. Col. Bauman through
Mr. Shepardson 8/17/44. (M. J. L.)*

14,630
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

1 Kauffmann -
Grinstead
SECRETARIAT*15 6/24*
1944 JUN 28 PM 12 17


27 June 1944

OSS

To Secretariat
Attention of Major J J Monigan Jr
From John C Hughes
Subject K Kauffmann-Grinstead

Replying to your memo of 24 June, I have written
Mr Kauffmann-Grinstead, as per the attached copy, and
will undertake to talk with him within the next few
days.

I am returning herewith the original letter
to General Donovan, together with copy of my reply, as
you may wish to keep this, for possible future reference,
in your Washington files.

JOH


27 June 1944

Mr E. Hoffmann-Christened
547 Madison Avenue
New York 17 NY

Dear Mr Hoffmann-Christened:

In General Dehaven's absence from Washington, your letter to him dated 22 June has been forwarded to me here in New York for reply.

If you will telephone me, Columbus 8 8540, when convenient to you, I should like to set some date at which time we can get together to discuss the matter outlined in your letter. I am familiar with your earlier letter to Mr John Emmerich, Jr of Wilmington, Delaware, and should like very much indeed to have your further ideas on similar matters, for the purpose of passing them on to our people in Washington.

Thanking you for your kind offer, believe me,

Cordially yours,

John C Hughes

Bonime Mr. 14/6/37
K. Kauffmann
Grinstead

K. KAUFFMANN-GRINSTEAD
 REGISTERED INVESTMENT ADVISER

342 Madison Avenue
 NEW YORK 17, N.Y.

June 22, 1944.

General William J. Donovan
 Director
 Office of Strategic Services
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of June 19th, concerning my letter to Mr. John Bancroft, Jr. about Dr. Bonime.

I have traveled in every part of Europe, except Russia, and from the time when Hitler came to power (April, 1933) to February, 1937, I lived in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, between Switzerland and Austria.

I became member of a Masonic lodge in Switzerland, and through that, as well as through my business and social connections, I have now developed a number of possibilities which it may be possible to utilize. Some of these Swiss connections are in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, others in the U.S. Also other connections in Liechtenstein.

If a representative of your office wishes to examine these possibilities, I am available either in New York, or in Washington.

My next visit to Washington will be on Thursday, June 29th, from 9 A.M. to 1.30 P.M.

I would not take your time for reading this letter, if I were not convinced, after careful consideration of all difficulties, that a worthwhile result appears probable.

Respectfully,

K. Kauffmann-Grinstead

Personal Supervision of Investments

• Management of Funds as Trustee •

Estate Planning

[The page contains several lines of extremely faint, illegible text.]

11-11-61

Even No. 10116

John is the O.F.O.

Bowling, Mr. 14, 1930
x Kauffman - Penetration K.

19 June 1944

Mr. E. Kauffman-Grinstead,
142 Madison Avenue,
New York 17, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Kauffman-Grinstead:

Your letter of 4 June 1944 to Mr. John Ban-
croft, Jr. has been forwarded to me. Contact has been
established with Dr. Bowling.

Your help is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,
Director

20 June 1944

Letter referred to in
Mr. Hughes memo given to Mr.
Hughes by Gen. Donovan.

Macaulay

Director's Office

See also 141
page 11 of 11

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

Bonime, Mr. 14,630
SECRET

Kauffman Grinstead

17 June 1944

To Brigadier General William J. Donovan
From John C. Hughes

When I was in Washington, you handed me a letter from K. Kauffmann-Grinstead which had come to you via Mr. John Bancroft. Yesterday, I saw Dr. Bonime, who is mentioned in this letter, and he is most anxious to cooperate with us in providing as much information as may be available. It will be necessary for Dr. Bonime in turn to contact a friend of his in order to get the proper name and address of the individual in Switzerland but he expects to be able to provide this information shortly.

I thought you might care to be advised of the situation, in case Kauffmann-Grinstead or Bancroft should make further inquiry. I am not writing Kauffmann-Grinstead any acknowledgment as I am under the impression that you yourself have dictated a letter to him.

*Has
this been
sent*

JCH

JCH

Top ↑

USS Form 4151

Date 29/11

TO: in chytan

Mrs O'D

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Office of the Executive Officer

Eve (30449)

TTD. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

17/194
Berlin, 1944

A. M. Kellin, Sr.

27 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: [Illegible]
DATE: 27 January 1944
BY: [Illegible]
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D R A F T

14,596
Borum

The Honorable Kenneth McKellar
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McKellar:

The application of Lt. Colonel Wythe G. Borum for an assignment with the Office of Strategic Services has received every consideration and continues to be held active.

To date no assignment has opened that would utilize the interesting background and talents of Colonel Borum.

You can be assured that when an appropriate opening in our staff occurs that every consideration will be shown the application of Colonel Borum.

Very truly yours,

Properly
Borum
for
14,596

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 27 Jan 45

TO : Mr. Cheston
 FROM : Secretariat
 SUBJECT:

1. The Secretariat has prepared for your approval and signature the attached proposed reply to Senator McKellar in answer to his inquiry concerning the application papers of Lt. Colonel Wylie G. Borum, of the Tennessee State Guard and former Military Aide to the governor of that state.

2. Major Culp, PPB, to whom Senator McKellar addressed his inquiry has informed the Secretariat that no assignment exists within OSS for Colonel Borum.

3. Upon our request, Major Culp has submitted the file on Col. Borum to the Secretariat. The file shows that Col. Borum is almost 49 years of age, that he first applied for a position with OSS through Senator McKellar on 15 June 1944. Personal History Forms were sent to the Colonel and completed forms were subsequently shown to several operating branches.

4. He has traveled extensively throughout Europe and in the Middle East, having been in the United States Foreign Service for a period of approximately 23 years. His age and the high grade (Colonel), which I understand he requested, have probably forestalled any serious consideration of his application.

5. Senator McKellar's letter and Major Culp's proposed reply are attached for your information.

Peter F. Pugliese
 PETER F. PUGLIESE
 1st Lt., AUS

*To Mr. Cheston.
 Looks O.K. to me, unless you
 want Culp to reply himself.
 (The Senator wrote a follow-up
 letter to Culp on Jan 16, 45
 copy attached -
 G. C. W.)*

*Don't forget to
X Mr. [unclear]*

1 July 1944

Honorable Kenneth McKellar,
United States Senate,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator McKellar:

Thank you for your letter of 18 June 1944 addressed to General Lenovan, who at present is absent from Washington.

We have asked Colonel Moran to fill out certain forms which are required of applicants for positions in this agency. I should point out, however, that it is almost impossible under present War Department regulations to obtain an officer's commission of any rank in the absence of prescribed qualifications of a technical nature.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Buxton,
Acting Director



Out
Car
the

Even No. rolls

Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f.6.3

141596

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Secretariat (Atten: Major J.J. Monigan)

DATE: 20 June 1944

FROM: Colonel Connely (S.W.L.) *SWP*

SUBJECT: Lt. Colonel Wylie Griffin Borum

Reference to your memorandum of 16 June on the above subject, following information is offered for your reply to Senator McKellar's letter.

SA-1 forms are being sent to Col. Borum so that more details of his background can be obtained. The brief personal history he submitted is not adequate for proper consideration. This procedure will involve several weeks and this office will advise if there is any current interest in the subject.

S.W.L.

OSS

1944 JUN 21 PM 4 28

SECRETARIAT

7 6/13

1. Colonel Wylie Griffin Borum
Military Aide to the Governor of the State of Tennessee
Tennessee State Guard
Nashville, Tennessee.

Dear Colonel Borum:

Your memorandum has been referred to this office as a person to be potentially qualified for a special mission. Attached herewith, are two personal history statements which you are urged to complete and forward to us at the earliest convenience. On receipt of these forms your qualifications will be studied and if you possess a background meeting our immediate needs, a personal interview with you will be arranged. At this time additional details regarding the proposed assignment will be discussed.

In the meantime you are requested to keep this contact we are making with you a matter of confidence.

SIDNEY W LITTLE
Major, AGD
Personnel Procurement Branch

022

SECRETARIAT

Top ↑

OSS Form #131

Date 19 June

To: MAJOR MONTAGAN

Please let me know what
action is taken as I have a
particular reason for wanting
to know.

(Oct) 2

en

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Check my title
also will submit

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Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

OSR FORM 1001a

Date 18 June 1944

To: General Donovan

A copy of the attached
letter has been sent to
Colonel Connely with the request
that he inform us of the
possibility of using the services
of Lt. Col. Hornum.

J. M. Morgan
J. M. Morgan
Major, CAG

Director of the Secretariat

Even No 111

Expense 11 1/25 1944

KENNETH McKELLAR, TENN., CHAIRMAN
 DANIEL WEBSTER, ARIZ.
 PERCY D. BARNETT, N. C.
 ROBERT H. HAYES, N. CAR.
 ALBERT J. BULLER, LA.
 JAMES M. HENRY, N. Y.
 DONALD W. BROWN, CALIF.
 W. LEE GARDNER, TEX.
 JAMES C. HANCOCK, ILL.
 JOHN L. McCLAIN, MISS.
 CLYDE M. HARRIS, MISS.
 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, N. CAR.
 C. DONALD HARRIS, DEL.
 HENRY HARRIS, MISS.
 E. M. HARRIS, CALIF.
 EDWARD V. ROBERTSON, WYO.
 GEORGE A. WILSON, IOWA
 DONALD W. HARRIS, MISS.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
POST OFFICES AND POST ROADS

June 15th, 1944

Major General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Donovan:

I am attaching a memorandum giving some facts about
Lt. Colonel Wylie Griffin Borum, Military Aide to the Governor
of the State of Tennessee (Tennessee State Guard).

Colonel Borum is anxious if possible to obtain a
commission in the Office of Strategic Services. I will greatly
appreciate it if you will advise me if there is any chance for
him.

Very sincerely yours,

JUN 17 1944

State of Tennessee
Adjutant General's Office
Nashville

Lieutenant Colonel Wylie Griffin Borum, Military Aide to the
 Governor of the State of Tennessee (Tennessee State Guard).

Born: Collierville, Tennessee, February 1, 1896. (Age 48)

Educated: Private, public schools, High School, George Washington
 University and London University.

Services: More than 25 years in the U. S. Foreign Service, serving
 in Germany, England, Ireland, France, Switzerland, Turkey,
 Sweden, Canada, Central America and in Washington, D. C.
 Last position: American Vice Consul in Toronto, Canada,
 for over two years. Now a Lt. Colonel in the Tennessee
 State Guard and will have completed first year on July 17.

All of my forefathers on both sides of my family were
 American citizens for many generations.

Senator McKellar has known me for about 27 years, since 1917.

In 1917 I worked in the H. O. B. under patronage of Rep.

Hubert F. Fisher of Memphis, Tenn.

~~SECRET~~

17 Oct. 1944

Col. Preston Goodfellow

Gen. W. J. Donovan

Board of Officers, 12 October 1944 meeting

What is the difficulty with Keave and Gurfein? What questions are in the mind of the Board? Perhaps I could answer them at once.

Also why should Abrignani be deferred? He is strongly recommended by Smiling. If you will read an account of Abrignani's current activities there would be no hesitation on the part of the Board.

I wish that in the case of the Board feeling lack of adequate information that before tabling the name you call me to see if I know anything about the man concerned.

W.J.D.

SECRET

Board of Officers 14529
CONFIDENTIAL, *Delay*
it is a recommendation

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 25 May 1944

TO: Mr. Cheston

FROM: Colonel Connelly

SUBJECT: Further Evidence on Unwarranted Delay by Officers Board and Headquarters Company on Names Submitted for Approval.

Yesterday I sent you a memorandum citing certain delays that have occurred in getting action on names of officers that this branch is trying to bring into OSS. The delays involved amounted to a period of 7 to 10 days. Four more cases have been reported today. On the 11th of May the names of the following officers were sent to Headquarters Company, Petty, Gleason, MacDonald and Bush, all Chemical Warfare Officers that R & D is urgently in need of. No action was taken until the meeting on the 22nd of May and only by virtue of fact we kept after Headquarters Company did we get the minutes back yesterday, May 24th. In other words two weeks had elapsed since we initiated action. The Using Branches blame this Branch for something that is entirely out of its control.

To clear this and get action it is going to be very important from now on that the following be done.

- (1) That the Officers Board meet more frequently.
- (2) It is going to be necessary for the recorder to make these minutes his personal interest and not to depend on courier service but to hand handle ingoing and outgoing papers.
- (3) It should be his duty to personally deliver to you the minutes for signature and do the same thing to Colonel Buxton and immediately give PPB a copy.

I hope when we get a new Headquarters Commander that he will clean house.

Take this up in

E.F.O.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

OSS Form 3057

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 5 May 1944

TO: Pvt Elias Bolanis

SUBJECT: OSS Orders

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to the destination indicated in your official travel orders, where you will report to Strategic Services Officer for duty with the OSS (Office or Branch). You will thereafter act under his orders and direction.

(For the Director)

SECRET

(38862)

14373
August 16, 1944

✓
Mr. Elmo Roper
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York City

Dear Elmo:

I talked to Ray Kellogg,
present head of our Field Photographic Branch,
and I am sorry to tell you that he does not
feel we can use Margaret Bourke-White in
connection with our field photographic work.

For your information only,
Ray states she was in the North African
theater when he was present. He knows her
work well and recognizes enthusiastically her
cleverness and, sometimes, sensational work.

He states that we could not
use her on any joint basis, part time, and
that even if she worked for us alone he is
certain combat troops do not want a woman
"cameraman" at the front. A number of
battalion commanders complained to him when
she was present in North Africa. They not
only feel responsible for her safety but have
to make special arrangements like independent
latrines, etc. for her convenience.

He thinks she is having
difficulty getting into the theaters and
wants to use a connection with OSS as a lever
to get travel orders. Whether this is so or
not, I cannot say.

I am sorry I cannot help
you out but know you will understand. It would
be bad for morale to overrule the head of the
branch.

-2-

If the General feels
differently he will be here a little later
and you can then reconsider the matter.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton

GEB FR

-2-

If the General feels
differently he will be here a little later
and you can then reconsider the matter.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Burton

GEB FS

6207

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Ensign E. J. Putsell, Jr.
FROM: John C. Hughes
SUBJECT: Bormann, Martin Ludwig

DATE: 17 March 1944 ^{3 3/16} MAR 18 AM**CONFIDENTIAL**

File: Biographical data

Replying to yours of 16 March, I attach herewith a biographical sketch on the above subject. This was prepared from various memoranda here in our office.

I trust this will be sufficient information for General Donovan, but if he wishes more detailed data on any one phase of Bormann's activities, we will be glad to see what we can do on this if you will advise us.



4, 66

BURMAN, Martin Ludwig

Born: June 17, 1900 in Halberstadt

Was educated in Eisenach and Weimar. In June, 1919 he joined Field Artillery Regiment 55 in Naumburg; was discharged in spring 1919. Served an apprenticeship on a farm in Mecklenburg.

In 1920 known to have joined an anti-Semitic association (Verein gegen Ueberhebung des Judentums); about the same time he seems to have joined "Organisation Rosenberg", responsible for all so-called "Feme-Morde" such as Rathmann, Ersberger & Kurt Eisner. In 1923 he became Abschnittsleiter (district head) in that organization. In connection with the so-called Parchimer Feme-Mord he was arrested and sentenced to one year in prison as accessory to a murder.

From 1927 on he devoted himself more or less completely to the organization of the National Socialist Movement. He joined the SA in Thuringia, was a collaborator of the newspaper "Nationalsozialist", and in April, 1928 became Gauwirtschaftsfuehrer (district manager) for Thuringia. In the same year he was called to Munich to become a member of the supreme command of the SA.

After Hitler came to power he became one of the top leaders of the Party; after Hess went to England he became his successor in many of his functions. He is now Chief of Staff of the Chancellery of the Party (Leiter der Partei Kanzlei); furthermore, he has a high command in the SS and the SA (Obergruppenfuhrer), he is a member of the Reichstag, a member of the War Cabinet and a member of the Council for the Defense of the Reich (Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung).

OK Sent to Washington JLL

Working Copy 100-3742

SECRET

2 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO 1/1 General E. R. Rusk

SUBJECT: ORDER

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to the destination indicated in your military orders, where you will report to the Chief, Office of Strategic Services, War Zone Theatre of Operations. You are, thereafter, to act under the instructions of the Chief, Office of Strategic Services for such Theatre.

William J. Donovan
Director, OSS

APPROVED:

APPROVED:

William F. Harris, III
Lieut. Colonel, PA
Chief, SO

J. H. Scribner
Deputy Director, OSS

Major General C. E. Rusk
PA Theatre Office

SECRET

Top ↑

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS
LA SALLE STREET
CHICAGO

13, 386

March 31, 1944

Dear General Donovan:

Your telegram was greatly appreciated and the compliments contained in it, while little deserved, will always be treasured by me. As a chap who raised two young brothers from early childhood — one of whom is a flier and was a Captain in the Marine Corps at the age of 23; another who was a Captain in the Army and whom we lost last September 19th — it gave me a particularly deep satisfaction to make a little effort and contribution that seemed to be part of one of the big things in the war.

I was especially happy and stimulated in the last month of my effort with the M.O. branch, that you were back from your important field activities and that I had an opportunity to become acquainted a bit with one of the great and able personalities of our country. It seems to me that you have an extraordinary group of men associated with you in the OSS operation and the contribution is going to be a great one.


Top ↑

Please feel that if you or your associates at any time in any way care to, you can call on me or any of those who work with me to hew wood and carry water in these parts or anywhere else. I plan to keep reasonably in touch with you and, as in the past, to be in Washington three or four days each month. This is a fact; not just an impression gathered from PM.

Everett Dirksen telephoned me enroute to his home in Pekin, Illinois, where he was being given a testimonial dinner, and indicated that you saw him. I particularly appreciate your doing this because I did want you to have a clear impression of my record, character and interest in government, and I suppose that, of all the men in public life, he knows me, my home, my friends and my civic and business activities best.

I wish you continued success and, again, please feel that you and your associates have added another loyal disciple.

Sincerely,


Chairman of the Board

28 MARCH 1944

11 1 23 15 50

SEE BELOW

XXXXXXXXX DONOVAN

OFFICIAL MESSAGE:

MR. MORTON BOONISH
 1221 NORTH LA SALLE
 C/O UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE
 CHICAGO 1, ILLINOIS

DISAPPOINTED TO HEAR IT NECESSARY FOR YOU TO REMAIN IN CHICAGO FOR
 REASONS STATED YOUR TELEGRAM BUT YOUR SPLENDID CONTRIBUTION YOU HAVE
 ALREADY MADE WILL PERMIT CARRYING ALONG AS YOU SUGGEST WITHOUT REQUIRING
 YOUR REMAINING SHORT PERIOD AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED. THE
 ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN ^{greatly helped} ~~MATERIALLY~~ ^{much} ~~STRENGTHENED~~ BY YOUR ~~SOJOURN~~ HERE AND
 I WISH TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE APPRECIATION OF YOUR EFFORTS AND SACRIFICES
 IN MY BEHALF.

Confession Copy

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Sent Via Western Union:

Eq 7 cr 68 Del- 410 P.M.

CLASS OF SERVICE
This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless for the limited character is indicated by a symbol printed above or preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION

1220

SYMBOLS

LT - Day Letter
NLT - Overnight Telegram
LC - Deferred Cable
NLT - Cable Night Letter
Day Letter

A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENTNEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARDJ. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination.

CA3 NL=CHICAGO ILL 26

1944 MAR 27 AM 3 04

GENERAL WILLIAM J DONAVAN=

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE 25 AND E WASHDC=

COMPLETELY UNANTICIPATED PERSONNEL PROBLEM IN FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN OF WHICH I AM PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF BOARD REQUIRES ME TO REMAIN IN CHICAGO FOR SEVERAL DAYS. HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN MAJOR ALDIS AND CUSHING AND CAPTAIN JONES TO EFFECTIVELY MOVE THE WORK AHEAD ALONG LINES YOU DESIRE. IN LIGHT OF OUR APRIL FIRST PLANS WILL AWAIT ADVICE FROM YOU. REST ASSURED OF MY LOYALTY TO YOU AND THE ORGANIZATION AND MY ADMIRATION OF THE CONTRIBUTION YOU ARE MAKING TO FINAL VICTORY. AM HAPPY THAT I COULD HAVE A SMALL PART=

MORTON BODFISH=

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

EVERETT M. DIRKSEN
1014 CONGRESS BUILDING

VERNON E. CABLE
SECRETARY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

January 18, 1944

COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Donovan:

I was happy to observe that you have added Mr. Morton Bodfish, Executive Vice President of the U. S. Savings and Loan League, to the personnel of the Office of Strategic Services because I consider him one of the most capable executives and organizational specialists in the country.

I have known Mr. Bodfish for many years and have had opportunity to appraise his capacity and the results which he has achieved in his chosen field.

In recent months he has served the Navy Department and rendered yeoman service in bringing about a better coordination and increased efficiency.

I am persuaded that he can render equally constructive service in your organization and I compliment you on his acquisition.

Sincerely,

Everett M. Dirksen
Everett M. Dirksen U. C.

Bonamy Douglas 13,488
SECRET

January 25th, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO LT. DOUGLAS BONAMY, USNR
 SUBJECT: ORDERS

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to New Delhi, India, where you will report to the Chief, Office of Strategic Services, Southeast Asia Command, to act under the instructions of the Chief, Office of Strategic Services, Southeast Asia Command.

G. Edward Buxton
 Acting Director.

APPROVED:

APPROVED:

Morton Smith
 Morton Smith
 Deputy Chief, NSC

J. M. Scribner
 J. M. Scribner
 Deputy Director, SSO

LT. Douglas Bonamy, Acting
 LT. Douglas Bonamy, Acting
 Theatre Officer

SECRET

12/12/51
Recommendation
& promotion
12 September 1944

SUBJECT: Allocation of vacancies.

TO: OSS Theater Officer.

1. The following recommendations for promotion and assignments to OSS are referred to you for allocation of vacancies before submission to the OSS Board of Officers:

1st Lt. Harry W. Britten - Promotion to Captain

2d Lt. Frederic J. Hadley III - Promotion to 1st Lt.

Capt. Des W. Pinckney - Assignment to Special Projects Off., OSS

2. It is requested that action be expedited in order to present these cases to the Board on 14 September 1944.

GEORGE B. RIGGIN,
Major, AGP,
Acting Recorder.

11.12.5
11.12.5
11.12.5

18 July 1944

SUBJECT: Appointment of Officer Candidates
TO : Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow

1. You are hereby authorized and directed in your capacity as President of the Board of Officers, appointed by paragraph 5, Special Order 164, Hq. and Hq. Detachment, OSS, dated 12 July 1944, to fill the six officer candidate vacancies for the month of July allocated to this agency by letter of The Adjutant General, Subject: Officer Candidate School, dated 9 June 1944, from the Continental U. S. backlog of officer candidates already selected by this agency, but who have not already been ordered to school.

2. Since all appointments for the month of July are made from personnel of the continental U.S., it would be well to make appropriate adjustments in the allotment fixed by General Order No. 40.

William J. Donovan
Director

6499

Booth, Waller

24 August 1945

Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
Director, OSS
25th & E Sts., N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear General:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of the
22nd of August.

I am off today for a few weeks leave after which
I shall return to Washington to get out of the Service. I
will come to see you to tell you goodbye before I leave finally
for Puerto Rico.

Very sincerely yours,

Wally Booth Jr
Waller B. Booth, Jr.
Lt. Col., Inf.

FORM 66 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 14 MARCH 1945

REC'D 1546

15 MAR 45

TO

SIGEX, KANDY

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

OUT 6378

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

FOR INFORMATION:

SI Booth, Waller

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACRUDER,
BIGELOW, FIELD SECTION, O'GARA, X-2

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#19017. SHEPARDSON AND HUTCHESON TO COUGHLIN AND TAYLOR.
REFERENCES OUR CABLE #14367 (OUT 2723) YOUR CABLE
#14374 (IN 3504). ✓

WALLER BOOTH IS REPORTING AS HEAD CHIEF OF SI FOR IBT.

IN LINE WITH YOUR PREVIOUS PROPOSAL IT IS INTENDED HE AND YOU
WILL APPOINT SUB-CHIEFS OF SI FOR ALL THIS BRANCH'S UNITS IN
THEATER WHICH WILL OPERATE UNDER HIS SUPERVISION.

KINDLY KEEP US ADVISED YOUR FRANK OPINION OF OUR
PERSONNEL. WE WILL BE PLEASED RECEIVE SUGGESTIONS.

ADM THXUB VHS EGV VB

1001 1730

15 MAR 45

SECRET

FILE COPY

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

United States

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET
 HQ & Hq DETACHMENT
 Office of Strategic Services
 ET0USA

6499
 Booth

9 November 1944

VIA POUCH

Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan
 Office of Strategic Services
 Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Lt. Colonel Waller Booth is being transferred to Washington for reassignment. I am sure you are familiar with his record with OSS and lately he has been the officer in charge of a combat reconnaissance patrol for various Cavalry Regiments.

His work, in my opinion, has been outstanding and he has been in the front lines most of the time in advance of the front lines for the past several months.

I do not think he has been in the Army long enough to rate any appreciable leave but it is respectfully suggested that if you could see your way clear to give him 30 days leave, it would be greatly appreciated and I can assure you very well deserved.

Sincerely yours,

Leah G. Gurnea

Leah Gurnea
 Commander, USNR
 Deputy Director

United States

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET

END
 JWA

United States

SECRET

Equa's Office M.C. SECRET & SECRET

HQ & HQ RETAINMENT
Office of Strategic Services
MEMPHIS

9 November 1946

VIA POST

Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

LT. Colonel Walter Heath is being transferred to Washington for reassignment. I am sure you are familiar with him; he was with OSS and lately he has been the officer in charge of a certain reconnaissance patrol for various Cavalry Regiments.

His work, in my opinion, has been outstanding and he has been in the front lines and most of the time in command of the front lines for the past several months.

I do not think he has been in the Army long enough to take any appreciable leave but it is respectfully suggested that if you could see your way clear to give him 30 days leave, it would be greatly appreciated and I can assure you very well deserved.

Sincerely yours,

Major General
Commanding, USAR
Deputy Director



United States

SECRET

Equa's Office

SECRET & SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Booth, Waller 6499
x Vlodzib
x Papant

File

TO: GENERAL DOMOVAN
FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL
SUBJECT: WALLER B. BOOTH

11 MARCH 1944

As of significant interest in our relations with
Ambassador Hayes, I am sending you herewith correspondence
concerning the work of Waller B. Booth which was handed to
me at the Department of State.

WAK
W. A. K.

Attachment

cc: Mr. Shepardson
General Magruder
Mr. Foster
Mr. Cheston

SECRET

MAR 12 1944

ATL
CAB

COPY

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tangier, Morocco, February 15, 1944.

TOP SECRET

Harry S. Villard, Esquire
 Chief, Division of African Affairs
 Department of State
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

You will recall that in 1942 and 1943 I had an extensive correspondence with the Department concerning a leak in the Legation which we finally traced down to the office of the Naval Attache and established as the work of the charwoman of that office. (See my letters of July 2 and September 30, 1943 to Paul ALLING.) I think the Department may be interested in the enclosed correspondence with the Embassy at Madrid which contains further evidence of the fact concerning that leak which Mr. Waller B. BOOTH has brilliantly established. You may recall in that connection that there was talk of the sacrifice of a perfectly innocent member of this staff who was suspected on no substantial grounds whatsoever as having been responsible. It will be recalled also that the Legation's confidence in this person never wavered. I think it very fortunate that an irreparable mistake was not made.

I have thought that OSS might be interested in learning through the enclosed of this further confirmation of Wallly Booth's excellent work.

Sincerely yours,

J. Hives Childs

Enclosure Letter Feb. 9, 1944 from Willard L. Baulac
 Legation's Letter, Feb. 15, 1944 to Ambassador Wines

The Foreign Service
of the
United States of America

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Madrid, February 9, 1944

SECRET

The Honorable
J. Rives Childs
American Charge d'Affaires
Tangier

Sir:

A Spaniard named Jose PINTO Portillo has been reportedly arrested at Sevilla and is stated to have worked for the American and British Consulates there and for representatives of both countries at Tangier. He is known to have stated he had photographed certain "plans" from one of our officers with a camera provided by the Germans and has conferred with the German Vice Consul at Sevilla. After one of these conferences he apparently came to Madrid and returned.

It has been suggested that in view of these circumstances the appropriate officials in the American offices at Sevilla and Tangier be suitably warned. A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the American Consul at Sevilla.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

/s/ Willard L. Beaulac
Counselor of Embassy

Copy to Sevilla

C O P Y

Tangier, Morocco, February 15, 1944

~~VERY SECRET~~

The Honorable
Carlton J. H. Hayes
American Embassy
Madrid, Spain

Sir:

It have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Embassy's secret communication of February 9, 1944, concerning a Spaniard named Jose PINTO Portillo reporting to have worked for the American and British Consulates in Sevilla, and who is known to have stated that he had photographed certain plans from one of our offices with a camera provided by the Germans.

This legation is only too well aware of the activities of this person and of his wife, Francesco PINTO. Jose Pinto Portillo was employed in 1942 by the American Naval Attache in Tangier, and he was subsequently arrested by the Spanish authorities and apparently consented to work for the Spanish Intelligence Service and for Axis Intelligence Service as the price of his freedom. Through a hard luck story he persuaded the office of the Naval Attache to employ his wife as charwoman. She is known to have been provided with a special camera by the Germans as well as with a very special master key which enabled her to open locked cabinets and to make photographs of various documents and papers. The office of the Naval Attache, at that time in charge of Captain Frank P. Holcomb, and officers of the OSS were so far convinced that the leak which was discovered in 1942 was due to a member of the Chancery staff, that it was only after much correspondence that a wholly innocent person was not sacrificed. It was not until the arrival of Mr. Waller E. BROWN, representing the OSS in Tangier, that the real facts regarding the leak in the office of the Naval Attache were established by him, and it was definitely proven that Pinto and his wife were responsible. The information contained in your letter is further proof, if further proof were needed, of the facts established by the splendid work of Mr. Brown. Very truly yours,

J. Rives Childs
Charge d' Affaires ad interim